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ARTICLE
ETHICAL MALPRACTICE
Nadia N. Sawicki*
ABSTRACT

Traditional claims of medical malpractice arise from
deviations from medical standards of care regarding knowledge,
professional decision-making, or technical skill. While many
standards of ethical behavior are just as firmly rooted in medical
custom as these more technical standards, U.S. courts have
typically been unwilling to acknowledge ethical violations alone as
compensable breaches of legal duty. This Article poses a question
that should be at the forefront of discussions about medical
liability in the twenty-first century-whether common law should
evolve to recognize violations of professional ethical norms as a
basis for tort liability. In evaluating this question, it draws
analogies to arguments that have been raised in the context of
legal malpractice, informed consent, and clinical practice
guidelines. The Article concludes that while standards of medical
ethics may be relevant to assessing the standard of care in medical
malpractice and other civil cases, it may be premature to treat
ethics violations as prima facie grounds for liability.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Why is there no tort cause of action for "ethical malpractice"?

Physicians and other health care providers are expected to comply
with professional standards of care regarding diagnosis and
treatment, and they are liable for malpractice if they fail to do so.
Modern medicine is also governed by the profession's ethical
norms, which are equally important and likewise integral to
professional practice. However, when physicians violate these
ethical norms, patients often have little in the way of legal
recourse.1
The news media is replete with examples of arguably
unethical conduct by physicians and other health care
professionals. In just the past year, news reports have cited
doctors using their own sperm to impregnate patients through in
vitro fertilization; 2 careless prescribing of opioids leading to
patient overdoses; 3 spreading of misinformation about COVID
treatments and vaccines 4 or prescribing of drugs with no medical

See infra Section III.B.
1.
2.
See Jonathan Edwards, Families Say a Fertility Doctor Used His Own Sperm to
Impregnate Patients. Now, He Must Pay Them Millions, WASH. POST (July 30, 2021, 6:02
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/07/30/fertility-doctor-wrong-sperm/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/V5AU-MGZ2] (reporting on a physician who impregnated patients seeking
fertility counseling with his own sperm, where patients were not made aware they would
receive his sperm).
See Jen Guadarrama, Doctor Linked to Deadly Patient Overdoses in Tennessee
3.
Before Moving to Indy Sentenced, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (June 16, 2021, 2:00 PM), https:/
/www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2021/06/16/tennessee-opioid-drug-case-doctor-darrelrinehart-sentenced-overdoses/7715790002/ [https://perma.cc/4W25-S4RZ] (reviewing the
physician's history of knowingly prescribing opioids and other medications "without a
medical purpose").
4.
See Jackie Drees, Physicians Who Post COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation May
Lose License, Medical Panel Says, BECKER'S HOSP. REV., https://www.beckershospitalrevie
w.com/digital-marketing/physicians-who-post-covid-19-vaccine-misinformation-may-lose-li
cense-medical-panel-says.html [https://perma.cc/BE3E-HEZQ] (Aug. 5, 2021, 4:45 PM)
(reporting on a statement made by the Federation of State Medical Boards that providers
who spread vaccine misinformation are subject to disciplinary action because the ethical
and professional responsibilities inherent to the profession demand a factual basis for the
practice of medicine and sharing of information); see also Peter Aldhous, Doctors Are
Attacking COVID Vaccines and Promoting Bogus Cures - And Getting Away with It,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 29, 2021, 11:25 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article
[https://perma.cc/S4BV-A9
/peteraldhous/covid-disinformation-doctors-disciplinary-action
C8] (setting out examples of providers in Texas and California who spread misinformation
but were not disciplined, and arguing that this pattern of misconduct without subsequent
discipline reflects a national problem).
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refusals to treat unvaccinated patients; 6 implicit and

explicit racism in the treatment of patients, particularly pregnant
and birthing women; 7 harassment of and discrimination against
colleagues; 8 violating patients' privacy by sharing photographs
and confidential information; 9 nonconsensual pelvic examinations
of gynecological patients by medical students; 10 abuses of medical
5.
Ivermectin Prescriptionsan Ethics Breach, Says Doctor, ABS-CBN NEWS (May 3,
2021, 10:37 AM), https://news.abs-cbn.com/video/news/05/03/21/ivermectin-prescriptionsan-ethics-breach-says-doctor [https:/perma.cc/GXS4-LH7K] (quoting a public health expert's
belief that prescribing ivermectin is an ethics breach because there is no factual basis for its
use or data-driven reason for a good faith belief in its efficacy).
6.
See Tanner Stening, With COVID-19 Infections Surging, Can Doctors Refuse
Treatment to Unvaccinated Patients?, NEWS@NORTHEASTERN (Aug. 25, 2021), https://news.
northeastern.edu/2021/08/25/with-covid-19-infections-surging-can-doctors-refuse-treatme
nt-to-unvaccinated-patients/ [https://perma.cc/M9LA-2E8K] (noting that in nonemergency
situations, a provider may lawfully refuse to treat patients such as unvaccinated patients
so long as the refusal is not motivated by animus against race, gender, sexuality, religion,

or other statutorily prohibited reasons, and concluding that there is a tension between
duties owed to individual patients and duties owed to the community in which the physician
practices); see also Can Physicians Decline Unvaccinated Patients?, AM. MED. ASS'N,
https://www. ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/can-physicians-decline-unvaccinated-pati
ents [https://perma.cc/5HGR-SXVE] (last updated Sept. 15, 2021) (concluding that in
general, a physician may not refuse a patient because of vaccination status, although the
obligation to treat an unvaccinated patient is not absolute and must be considered in light
of the risks to other patients and the physician's ability to continue to provide care for
others).
7.
See Sema Sgaier & Jordan Downey, What We See in the Shameful Trends on U.S.
Maternal Health, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/
11/17/opinion/maternal-pregnancy-health.html [https://perma.cc/2BQU-YZY7] (explaining
the correlation between race and increased rate of maternal risk, discussing how
community-level factors such as housing and transportation further increase maternal risk
when unavailable, and highlighting that these community-level factors are more available
in predominantly White and higher socioeconomic status communities).
8.
See Mike Donoghue, Civil Rights Lawsuit Filed Against SVMC, Podiatry Chief,
BENNINGTON BANNER (Sept. 10, 2021), https://www.benningtonbanner.com/local-news/civil
-rights-lawsuit-filed-against-svmc-podiatry-chief/articled63f7744-1279-11 ec-96bb-337cc6
aae3fl.html [https://perma.cc/8G8L-5Q78] (podiatry residents filed a multi-count complaint
alleging that they were subjected to discrimination and harassment based on race,
ethnicity, and religion, which resulted in retaliatory discharge, failure to protect
whistleblowers, and other labor-law-related issues).
9.
See Neil Vigdor, Doctors Are Investigated After Posting Organ Photos Online as
'PriceIs Right' Game, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/15/u
s/grand-rapids-instagram-surgery-photos.html [https://perma.cc/A2KR-UHFD] (presented
as an example of physician conduct that "certainly is a serious breach of ethics" but does
not clearly trigger liability under current tort law).
10.
See Terry Tsang, Support HB - 5067 to Stop Non-Consensual Pelvic/Prostate
Exams Under Anesthesia, CONN. MIRROR (Mar. 17, 2021), https://ctmirror.org/category/ctviewpoints/show-respect-ask-patients-before-using-them-to-teach-support-hb- 5067-to-stop
-non-consensual-pelvic-prostate-exams-under-anesthesia-for-educational-purposes-terry-t

sang [https://perma.cc/Z33T-EH9C] (discussing the lack of specificity in consent forms
presented to patients at Yale New Haven Health prior to undergoing surgery requiring
general anesthesia, where women are not made aware they may be subjected to a
nonconsensual pelvic exam during surgery that is unrelated to and not indicated by the
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and research ethics by government doctors within the VA11 and
ICE systems;12 and ongoing sexual abuse of patients, 13 including
the infamous case of Dr. Larry Nassar.14
reason for surgery); see also Phoebe Friesen et al., Legislative Alert: The Ban on
Unauthorized Pelvic Exams, 25 NYSBA HEALTH L.J., Winter 2020, at 29, 29-34
(summarizing the history of nonconsensual pelvic exams performed while a patient is under
anesthesia and the medical field's failure to address this conduct, resulting in twenty-two
bills across seventeen states intended to address this harmful conduct, which is unethical
but not tortious); Lori Bruce, A Pot Ignored Boils On: Sustained Calls for Explicit Consent
of Intimate Medical Exams, 32 HEC F. 125, 126, 128 (2020), https://www.nebi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC7223770/ [https://perma.cc/AVQ2-GUJ3] (setting out a brief history
of nonconsensual pelvic exams, and then presenting official position statements by the
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (ACOG), and the American Medical Association (AMA), such as the
AAMC's statement that "such practice is unethical and unacceptable").
11.
See Jill Castellano, New Details Exposed in Unethical Liver Study at San Diego
VA, CBS8, https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/local/inewsource/unethical-liver-study-san-d

[https://perma.cc/EQ9V-2QPL] (Feb.
iego-va/509-cbbaeal6-cbac-4b8a-b61b-cc7dee98db25
16, 2021, 4:55 PM) (reporting on additional liver tissue removed from VA patients during
biopsies, without consent, for research purposes).
See Adam Gabbatt, 'He Hurt Me' Migrants Who Accused ICE Gynecologist of
12.
Abuse Speak Out, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-ne
ws/2020/nov/21/congress-ice-gynecologist-abuse-allegations-petition [https://perma.cc/F9W
M-8GVK] (reporting that after women set forth claims of sexual abuse by Dr. Mahendra
Amin, the women were deported or placed on a list for deportation).

13.
See Amy Silverman, Anger at Phoenix Facility Where IncapacitatedWoman Gave
Birth, GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/
20/phoenix-coma-woman-gave-birth [https://perma.cc/ZCN2-689N] (discussing woman who
became pregnant while incapacitated, which was undoubtedly the result of rape given that
she had been nonresponsive and incapacitated since early childhood and could not have
consented to sexual activity); James M. DuBois et al., Sexual Violation of Patients by
Physicians:A Mixed-Methods, Exploratory Analysis of 101 Cases, 31 SEXUAL ABUSE 503,
514, 517 (2019) (discussing how sexual contact with patients is unethical and harms
patients but has not been resolved at the state level through licensure, boards, or
professional groups issuing statements discouraging or prohibiting such conduct,
illustrating that unethical conduct is difficult to deter without tort liability).
See Some High-Profile Doctors Who Sexually Abused Their Patients, ATLANTA
14.
J.-CONST., https://doctors.aje.com/sex_abuse_doctorsprofiles/ [https://perma.cc/6V3H-UK
EJ] (profiling doctors who sexually assaulted women and what consequences they faced,
such as: Dr. Harold Bloomfield, who drugged and sexually assaulted two women, resulting
in community service and being barred from practice for five years; Dr. Kevin Brown, who
was found guilty on twenty-one counts including sexual penetration with a foreign object,
resulting in twelve and a half years in prison and sex offender registration; Dr. William
Warren Frost, who pled guilty to two counts of indecent assault following the allegations of
multiple women, resulting in license revocation and two counts of indecent assault; Dr.
Nelson Hendler, who "engaged in sexual misconduct" including dispensing drugs in return
for oral sex, resulting in suspension of his license and "probation before judgment" resulting
in expungement of court records and retention of ownership in a clinic; Dr. Melvin Levine,
who was credibly suspected of abusing "thousands of pediatric patients" across multiple
decades but faced no charges because he ended his life one day after the complaint was
filed; Dr. Guy Owens, who was accused by more than six women of sexual assault enabled
by his prescribing pain medications to them, resulting in three years of probation in lieu of
incarceration; Dr. Raymond Reiter, a former physician for the NBA's Nets and NFL's
Giants who pled guilty to one count of criminal sexual assault and four counts of criminal
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The most widely publicized ethical breaches, like those
involving ongoing sexual assault of students and athletes, may
result in adverse professional or legal actions against the

wrongdoers. These may include revocation of clinical privileges at
a hospital, discipline by a professional licensing board, the
imposition

of

civil

monetary

penalties,

or

even

criminal

punishment. 15 Such actions may be effective in punishing these
actors and deterring similar conduct in the future. However, they
provide little in the way of remedies for patients or others who

have suffered harm as a result of ethical breaches. 16

The traditional model by which injured parties seek
compensation in the U.S. legal system is through tort litigation.
For example, when patients suffer physical injuries as a result of

a physician's medical malpractice, they can seek a tort remedy if
they are able to prove that their injuries were caused by a breach
of the medical profession's standard of care. 17 But when physicians
violate the ethical norms of the profession, tort recovery is not so
simple.1 8 Patients who suffer dignitary or even physical harms as
a result of a health care provider's failure to comply with the
ethical commitments of the profession may find their claims for
sexual conduct, resulting in license revocation and one year in prison); see also Deb Erdley,
10 Years Later, Sandusky Scandal at Penn State Has Opened the Door to Others Coming to
Light, Experts Say, PITT. TRIB. REV. (Nov. 5, 2021, 12:01 AM), https://triblive.com/news/p
ennsylvania/ten-years-later-sandusky-scandal-at-penn-state-has-opened-the-door-to-other
s-coming-to-light-experts-say/ [https://perma.cc/XT9Q-RPV8] (explaining how media coverage
of abuse perpetrated by Jerry Sandusky led to victims of sexual assault coming forward,
resulting in Michigan State paying $500 million to settle claims related to Dr. Larry
Nassar, Ohio State paying $41 million to settle sexual assault claims related to Dr. Richard
Strauss, the University of Southern California paying in excess of $852 million to settle
sexual assault claims related to Dr. George Tyndall, and the University of Michigan
spending $10.7 million on defending lawsuits, investigations, and counsel for victims of
sexual assault); Sexual Abuse by Hospitals and Medical Centers, LEVY KONIGSBERG LLP, h
ttps://www.sexabuseclaimscenter.com/sexual-abuse-by-hospitals-and-medical-centers/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/YJ3P-7LJH] (pointing out that sexual assault settlements frequently include
a confidentiality agreement and that hospitals do not have an obligation to report when
staff are investigated or disciplined for sexual abuse and may avoid liability by terminating
physicians).
15.
See cases cited supra note 14.
16.
Revocation of clinical privileges, professional discipline, and criminal punishment
result in revocation or limitation of the physician's right to practice but do not result in
compensation for patients who have been injured. Civil monetary penalties, which may be
imposed for breaches of (for example) the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services'
Conditions of Participation, are paid to state and federal regulatory agencies rather than
injured patients. See, e.g., Civil Monetary Penalty Reinvestment Fund, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE

& MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification
/SurveyCertificationGenInfo/LTC-CMP-Reinvestment [https://perma.cc/VN3Y-JJE9] (last
visited Jan. 1, 2022); 42 C.F.R. § 488.433 (2020).
17.
See BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 76-77 (3d ed. 2014).
18.
See infra Section III.B.
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tort compensation rejected. 19 And even when significant physical

harms result, such claims may fall outside traditional categories
of tort causes of action. 20 As a result, patients who have experienced
very real harms as a result of egregious misconduct may be unable
to recover.
Tort law is intended to serve a gap-filling function. When two
parties do not already have a preexisting contractual agreement
about how to resolve disputes, and where no statutory law defines
the contours of permissible behavior, the common law of tort steps
in to set expectations and assign responsibility. 21 Questions about
the ethical expectations of the medical profession seem well suited
for this kind of resolution, particularly given the fact that ethical
standards of the medical profession have gotten more concrete and
more settled over time. 22
And indeed, there are at least two situations where
well-established legal precedent imposes tort liability for

deviations from a norm of professional ethics. Starting in the
1950s, U.S. common law formalized the principle that physicians
have a legal duty to support patients in making informed and
autonomous decisions about medical treatment under the doctrine
of informed consent. 23 Unlike traditional malpractice actions, tort
actions for breach of informed consent are not about technical skill,
medical knowledge, or diagnostic ability; rather, they are based on
expectations regarding the relationship between doctor and
patient. Perhaps more surprisingly, in this context the ethical
norm of disclosure arose as a result of developments in the legal
sphere. In other words, while traditional medical malpractice
liability sets the standard of care by looking to established medical
custom, 24 the imposition of liability for breaches of informed consent

19.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.B.
20.
See Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1346
21.
(2017) (describing tort doctrine as a means of closing gaps in "open-textured" cases); Jay M.
Feinman, Unmaking and Remaking Tort Law, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 61, 62 (2005) (describing
progressive tort law as "ad hoc ... innovat[ing] to fill gaps in other means of the regulation
of safety and the compensation of victims"); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, PrivateLaw in the Gaps,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1689, 1716-17 (2013) (describing competing views of tort law's
gap-filling function).
Ellen Fox et al., Medical Ethics Education: Past, Present, and Future, 70 ACAD.
22.
MED. 761, 761-67 (1995) (identifying and analyzing various methods regarding the
education of medical ethics); Robert M. Veatch & Diane Fenner, The Teaching of Medical
Ethics in the United States of America, 1 J. MED. ETHICS 96, 99-103 (1975) (illustrating the
growth in teaching medical ethics in professional and medical schools over time).
23.
See infra Section III.A.2.
24.
See infra Section III.A.1-2.
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duties was as much an independent legal development as it was
an extension of still-advancing professional norms. 25 Secondly, the
long-standing ethical obligation to maintain confidentiality within

the doctor-patient relationship has developed, over time, into a
variety of avenues for legal recovery, though not in as consistent a
way as in the context of informed consent. 26
Over time, many ethical norms regarding health care have
been integrated into the legal system by way of statutes and
regulations-for example, the Federal Common Rule, 27 state health
care decision-making statutes, 28 and the Uniform Determination of
Death Act. 29 That said, the process of formalizing ethical norms by
the legislative and administrative branches is a slow one with

many roadblocks.3 0 In such situations, it would be reasonable for
common law to step in to fill in the gaps between well-accepted
principles of medical ethics and deliberative legislative action.
Defining civil liability by reference to the ethical norms of the
medical profession would provide clearer guidance to health care
providers about the law's expectations for their behavior and
would serve law's expressive function 31 by bringing ethical

principles to the forefront of medical practice. More importantly,
it would offer a remedy to patients who are harmed by conduct
that deviates from these norms and who currently have limited
legal recourse.
To date, U.S. courts have been unwilling to recognize a cause

of action for ethical malpractice 32-that

is, an independent claim

25.
See infra Section III.A.2.
26.
See infra Section IH.A.3.
27.
45 C.F.R. § 46(A) (1991).
28.
See generally Charles P. Sabatino, The Evolution of Health Care Advance
PlanningLaw and Policy, 88 MILBANK Q. 211 (2010).
29.

UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT (1981).

30.
Drew DeSilver, Congress Is Off to a Slow Start in 2021, Much as It Has Been in
Previous Years, PEw RscH. CTR. (Aug. 13, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/20
21/08/13/congress-is-off-to-a-slow-start-in-2021-much-as-it-has-been-in-previous-years/
[ht
tps://perma.cc/3WSV-2PCZ] (discussing the challenges of passing legislation in general).
31.
See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2025-26 (1996) (examining the expressive function of the law by analyzing the statement
that laws make with respect to social norms).
32.
The Author is not aware of this terminology being used in the medical context,
but it has been used in the context of legal malpractice. In one jurisdiction, Illinois, some
claimants have explicitly sought recovery using the language of "ethical malpractice," and
courts have rejected their attempts to do so. See, e.g., Nagy v. Beckley, 578 N.E.2d 1134,
1138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (rejecting "ethical malpractice" as a distinct cause of action);
Skorek v. Przybylo, 628 N.E.2d 738, 740 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (noting that the cause of action
of "ethical malpractice" does not exist in Illinois); Bay Grp. Health Care, LLC v. Ginsberg
Jacobs, LLC, No. 15 C 0986, 2017 WL 770984, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2017) ("There is no
'ethical malpractice' or 'professional responsibility tort' in Illinois.").
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on equal footing with claims like malpractice, breach of informed
consent, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Some courts explicitly refuse to acknowledge
that the ethical standards of the medical profession might be part
of the standard of care that would ground a traditional malpractice
claim. 33 In many cases, courts' reasoning amounts to the circular
argument that because ethical standards are not legally binding,

they do not create a basis for liability. 34 And yet, this seems
inconsistent with tort law's extraordinary deference to the custom
of the medical profession in establishing the standard of care and
the role that common law plays in advancing policy goals that are
not yet reflected in legal precedent.
This Article introduces the question of whether tort liability
should be imposed when health care providers breach ethical
norms. To answer this question, the Article introduces arguments
from the world of legal malpractice, draws analogies to the tort of
informed consent, and considers the history of clinical practice
guidelines in malpractice litigation. Ultimately, this Article
demonstrates that while there may be good reasons to recognize
an independent legal duty to comply with the professional ethics
of medical practice, there are risks to this approach as well. It
analyzes the challenges of recognizing a new cause of action for
ethical malpractice and concludes that a more modest approachrecognizing that ethical norms may be part of the standard of care
in a traditional medical malpractice case-is, at present, the better
option. Only where distinct ethical norms are universally accepted
within the medical profession would it be more appropriate to
recognize independent causes of action for breaches of those
norms.
This Article is part of a broader scholarly inquiry about the
ways in which principles of medical ethics are recognized, deferred
to, or formally adopted within the U.S. legal system. Civil liability
is but one way in which this might occur, and looking at the issue
through the lens of tort law effectively illustrates the challenges
and tensions that might arise from more formal integration of
medical ethics into U.S. law.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II offers a brief
introduction to medical ethics, including the medical profession's
attempts to delineate specific ethical standards. Part III describes
the traditional ways in which patients seek recovery for injuries
33.
34.

See infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.3.
See infra Section III.B.1.
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resulting from medical harms and then introduces illustrative
examples of how courts treat claims for civil recovery when
plaintiffs raise claims of ethical violations. Part IV describes the
various ways in which recovery for breaches of ethical standards
might be structured. Part V draws on academic literature relating
to legal ethics, medical ethics, and tort law to identify several
compelling arguments as to why U.S. law might be reluctant to

create an independent basis of tort recovery for breaches of
professional ethics. It demonstrates that while these arguments
all have merit, they pose no challenge to the recognition of ethical
norms as being relevant to the standard of care in traditional

malpractice actions. Finally, Part VI identifies avenues for future
research, including practical and procedural questions about how
tort law might treat claims for ethical malpractice.
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAL ETHICS

The Hippocratic Oath is well recognized as being foundational
to the discipline of medical ethics. 35 Even those outside the
medical field are likely familiar with the phrase, "First, do no

harm." 36 And yet, as modern scholars recognize, the ethical
guidance the Hippocratic Oath provides is outdated, imprecise,
and arguably inconsistent with modern medical practice. 37
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a complete
overview of the historical development of medical ethics in the
35.

EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF

MEDICAL PRACTICE 195 (1981) (describing the Hippocratic Oath as "the wellspring for much
of medical ethics in nineteenth-century America"); ALBERT R. JONSEN, A SHORT HISTORY
OF MEDICAL ETHICS 95 (2000) (in describing the history of medical ethics, noting that the
"decorum described in the Hippocratic books ... still suited the American doctor" of the
twentieth century).
36.
Although this phrase is sometimes part of the versions of the Oath used in modern
medical schools, it may come as a surprise to many that "first, do no harm" is not part of
the original text of the Oath. See Spyros Retsas, Rapid Response: First Do No Harm: The
Impossible Oath, BMJ (July 19, 2019), https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.14734/rr-2 [ht
tps://perma.cc/N45D-8AFA]; Editor's Note, The Lie of Primum Non Nocere, 64 AM. FAM.
PHYSICIAN 1942 (2001) (citing A.R. Jonsen, Do No Harm, 88 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 82732 (1978)).
37.

See, e.g., STEVEN H. MILES, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH AND THE ETHICS OF MEDICINE

2 (2004) ("After 2,400 years, its age is showing. It swears by Apollo and includes an ethic
for treating slaves. It does not mention informed consent and disavows surgery. It did not
anticipate managed care."); Fabrice Jotterand, The Hippocratic Oath and Contemporary
Medicine: Dialectic Between Past Ideals and Present Reality?, 30 J. MED. & PHIL. 107, 108
(2005) (describing the Oath as "show[ing] more confusion than clarity" and serving a
"symbolic" rather than a practical role in the history of medicine); Kamran Abbasi, FirstDo
No Harm:The Impossible Oath, BMJ (July 19, 2019), https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj
.14734 [https://perma.cc/KM5P-PVJT] ("First do no harm, it seems, is an ancient oath true
in spirit but impossible to practise in the messy business of modern healthcare.").
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United States. 38 For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to
highlight a few points about how professional ethics have been
integrated into the practice of medicine in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries.
Although ethics have always been part of medical practice,
the discipline of medical ethics evolved most significantly in the
mid- to late-twentieth century. Prompted in part by increased
public awareness of horrific abuses in the context of medical
research-such as Nazi experimentation brought to public light
during the 1945-1946 Nuremberg trials and the 1972 revelation
of the forty-year Tuskegee Syphilis Study undertaken by the U.S.
Public Health Service-medical researchers and practitioners
were put on notice that their existing practices no longer aligned
with societal expectations. 39 One prominent scholar of medical
ethics describes this as a "most remarkable-and thoroughly
controversial-transformation" that "altered almost every aspect
of the relationship between doctor and patient." 40 In 1979, Tom
Beauchamp and James Childress published Principles of
Biomedical Ethics, the foundational text that identified four key
principles of ethical medical practice: patient autonomy,
beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. 41 Since that time, the
theory and practice of medical ethics has become integrated into
formal medical education, and health care practitioners recognize
ethics as being foundational to the treatment relationship. 42
There is, however, no single code of medical ethics that
physicians can point to in the same way attorneys can point to

38.

Those interested in learning more about this history would be well-advised to

read DAVID. J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND
BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (1991).

See generally JONSEN, supra note 35, at 99-102, 108-09, 117 (describing the
39.
Tuskegee Syphilis Study as the "one event [that] more than any other propelled the old
medical ethics" forward).

40.

ROTHMAN, supra note 38, at 1.

41.

TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS

13 (8th ed. 2019). The text is currently in its eighth edition, and its principles are still widely
relied upon today. Tom Beauchamp & James Childress, Principlesof Biomedical Ethics:
Marking Its FortiethAnniversary, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Oct. 24, 2019, at 9.
See Chiara Crico et al., Evaluating the Effectiveness of Clinical Ethics
42.
Committees: A Systematic Review, 24 MED. HEALTH CARE PHIL. 135, 144-45, 148 (2020)
(explaining that ethics committees informally take on an educational role during
consultations, perform formal educational activities to train staff on recognizing and
responding to common ethical issues, and introduce ethical considerations into the
treatment relationship, such as advocating for patient autonomy and reminding providers
of ethical duties regarding the provision of care based on patient values).
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their state codes of professional conduct. 43 Much of medical ethics
is "in the air," so to speak. These ethical standards are only
sometimes formalized in writing and are rarely binding and
enforceable in the same way as traditional legal standards. While

some

general

practices

are uniformly

recognized

as

core

commitments of the medical profession-like protection of patient
confidentiality and deference to patients' autonomous and
informed medical decision-making-applying the principles of

medical ethics to specific cases of conflict requires nuanced
analysis and reflection. " This can be seen in the plethora of
scholarship by academics and practitioners of medicine in journals

like the American Journal of Bioethics, the Kennedy Institute of
Ethics Journal, and the Hastings Center Report, as well as in
purely medical publications like the JAMA and the New England
Journal of Medicine. Nearly all large hospitals and health care
facilities have developed interdisciplinary ethics committees4 5 to
provide guidance and resolution of ethical conflicts. 46 Some health
43.
See STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 163 (2008) (drafter's annotations explaining what ethical principles are
implicated by ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct); see also Commission on Ethics
20/20, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/co
mmitteescommissions/standingcommitteeonprofessionalism2/resources/ethics2020hompe
age/ [https://perma.cc/P4H6-6DQ6] (last visited Jan. 31, 2022) (ABA page offering materials
produced by the ABA's commission on ethics).
44.
See Morten Magelssen et al., Four Roles of Ethical Theory in Clinical Ethics
Consultation, AM. J. BIOETHICS, July 29, 2016, at 26-27 (describing the role of normative
ethical theories in assisting in, but not determining the outcomes of, clinical ethics
consultations); Joseph B. House et al., Understanding Ethical Dilemmas in the Emergency
Department: Views from Medical Students' Essays, 48 J. EMERGENCY MED. 492, 495-96

(2015) (using medical student's reflections on ethical conflicts to demonstrate that ethical
principles are complex, conflicting, and difficult to apply in practice).
45.
See Glenn McGee et al., A NationalStudy of Ethics Committees, AM. J. BIOETHICS,
Dec. 7, 2010, at 62 (noting that while only 1% of U.S. hospitals had ethics committees in
1983, by 1998 that figure was over 90%, and indicating that this rise may have been in part
due to Joint Commission Requirements); Ellen Fox et al., Ethics Consultation in United
States Hospitals: A National Survey, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar. 12, 2007, at 15 (finding that
100% of hospitals with more than 400 beds, and 81% of all general hospitals, have ethics
consultation services).

46.
See McGee et al., supra note 45, at 60-64 (reporting results of a questionnaire
given to members of ethics committees, and noting that "[t]he majority of consultation time
was spent on issues of patient autonomy; the capacity of patients to make their own health
decisions; and on miscommunication among staff, clinicians, and patients about the
meaning and goals of treatment"); see also Marion Danis et al., Health Care Ethics
Programsin U.S. Hospitals:Results from a National Survey, BMC MED. ETHICS, July 29,
2021, at 2-6, 11-12 (noting that ethics committees are increasingly taking on a role in policy
development and working to educate providers on ethical duties, in addition to supporting
patients and families during consultations); George Annas & Michael Grodin, Hospital
Ethics Committees, Consultants, and Courts, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 554, 556-57 (2016)
(summarizing the development of ethics committees after the Quinlan case and noting that
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care systems, like the Cleveland Clinic, have established standing
clinical ethics consultation services staffed by full-time ethicists
who are fully integrated into the care team.4 7
Ethical guidance on particular areas of conflict may also be
provided by professional organizations, like the American Medical
Association (AMA), that publish formal statements, opinions, and
judgments on frequently encountered ethical dilemmas. Given the
breadth of the modern practice of medicine, these ethics
statements address an incredible variety of substantive topicsincluding, but not limited to, surrogate decision-making for
patients who lack capacity, 48 obstetric violence, 4 9 sexual contact
with patients, 50 disclosure of financial conflicts of interest, 51
conscientious objection,5 2 racial bias in health care, 5 3 and many
others. While these ethics opinions are not binding, their guidance
reflects a deliberative consensus opinion on the appropriate
resolution of particular ethical conflicts. 54
in large "safety net" hospitals, disputes before ethics committees reflect increasing concern
about end of life issues such as disagreement between providers and the patient or the
patient's family on "treatment judged to be nonbeneficial or even harmful").
47.

Clinical Ethics, CLEVELAND CLINIC, https://my.clevelandclinic.org/departments/

patient-experience/depts/bioethics/bioethics/clinical-ethics [https://perma.cc/HRY6-WQXD]
(last visited Feb. 1, 2022) (describing the operation and function of the Clinic's Center for
Bioethics).
See Decisions for Adult Patients Who Lack Capacity, Code of Medical Ethics
48.
Opinion 2.1.2, AM. MED. ASS'N, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/decisionsadult-patients-who-lack-capacity [https://perma.cc/S5SS-9LJU] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022)
(discussing decisions for adult patients who lack capacity).
Committee Opinion No. 664: Refusal of Medically Recommended Treatment
49.
During Pregnancy AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS 2, 5 (2016), https://w

ww.acog.org/-/media/project/acog/acogorg/clinical/files/committee-opinion/artiles/2016/06/
refusal-of-medically-recommended-treatment-during-pregnancy.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3U
G-NUAD].
50.
See Romantic or Sexual Relationships with Patients, Code of Medical Ethics
Opinion 9.1.1, AM. MED. ASS'N, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/romanticor-sexual-relationships-patients [https://perma.cc/7E6Q-DLLT] (last visited Feb. 20, 2022)
(discussing romantic or sexual relationships with patients); COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUD.
AFFS., PHYSICIANS WITH DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR, REPORT 3-I-09 (2009).

51.

See Transparency in Health Care, Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 11.2.4, AM.

MED. ASS'N, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/transparency-health-care

[ht

tps://perma.cc/D6UW-2YPC] (last visited Feb. 20, 2022) (discussing transparency in health
care); COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUD. AFFS., PHYSICIANS' SELF-REFERRAL, REPORT 1-I-08

(2008).
52.

Committee Opinion No. 385: The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive

Medicine, 110 AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS 1203, 1203-07 (2007).

See Opinion 9.121 - Racial and Ethnic Health Care Disparities,Code of Medical
53.
Ethics, 16 AM. MED. ASS'N J. ETHICS 440, 440-41 (2014).
That said, the ethics opinions of professional associations reflect only the
54.
consensus of their membership, which is not reflective of the full population of U.S. health
care providers. See Roger Collier, American Medical Association Membership Woes
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III. COMPENSATION FOR PATIENT INJURIES UNDER COMMON LAW

Patient injuries arising from the acts of health care providers
arise in a wide variety of contexts. Often, the avenue for recovery
is clear-a patient who is negligently misdiagnosed, for example,
can rely on the tort claim of medical malpractice as a basis for a

claim for damages. However, some patient injuries do not fit neatly
into the traditional model of medical malpractice and,
furthermore, fail to meet the elements of other potential avenues

for legal recovery, such as claims for battery, breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress, or breach of
confidentiality. 55
I argue that claims arising out of physicians' ethical violations

are among those most likely to slip through the cracks of
established common law theories of recovery, leaving patients
with no remedy. Several of the cases cited in the Introduction to
this Article support this. While lawsuits have been filed against
physicians who use their own sperm to impregnate patients, 56

noted scholar of reproductive tort law Dov Fox states that "[e]very
lawsuit to date by former patients and their children [on these

grounds] has been unsuccessful."5 7 Doctors who spread COVID
Continue, 183 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 713, 713 (2011) (noting that today approximately 15% of
physicians are AMA members, down from 75% in 1950); see also GROUP OF 6,
http://www.groupof6.org/home.html [https://perma.cc/FPF4-4UL7] (last visited Mar. 1,
2022) (providing membership statistics including: the AAFP with 136,000 members; the
ACP with 163,000 members; the ACOG with 60,000 members; the AOA with 151,000
members; and the APA with 37,400 members).
See infra Section III.A.
55.
See Matt Driffill & Christian Garzone, Rochester Doctor Accused of Using Own
56.
Sperm to InseminateFemalePatientin New Lawsuit, ROcHESTERFIRST, https://www.roches
terfirst.com/news/local-news/rochester-doctor-accused-of-using-own-sperm-to-inseminate-f

emale-patients-in-new-lawsuit-dr-morris-wortman-gynecologist-center-for-menstrual-diso
rders-alleged-medical-malpractice/ [https://perma.cc/8SS4-MR5X] (Sept. 14, 2021, 2:18 PM)
(summarizing the claims brought against Dr. Morris Wortman, who artificially
inseminated women with his own sperm).
57.
See Adam Liptak, When Dad Turns Out to Be the Fertility Doctor, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/magazine/fertility-fraud-sperm.html
[https://perma.cc/92D4-Y7AM] (noting that even where DNA evidence conclusively proves
that a physician inseminated the plaintiff's mother, cases face dismissal on the grounds
that the physician did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, allowing this conduct to "fall
into a legal gray area"); see also Jody Lyne6 Madeira, News on the Fertility Fraud Front:
Mortimer v. Rowlette Raises Possibilityof Punitive Damages, BILL HEALTH (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/22/fertility-fraud-mortimer-rowlette-dam
ages/ [https://perma.cc/GN32-447Q] (summarizing the court's holding that Dr. Gerald
Mortimer owed no duty of care to the now-adult daughter who was conceived using Dr.
Mortimer's sperm because the tortious conduct at issue predates her conception and under
current tort law the now-adult daughter lacks standing); Sydni R. Eibshutz, "Dr.,I Don't
Want Your Baby!": Why America Needs a Fertility PatientProtectionAct, 106 IOWA L. REV.
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misinformation are unlikely to be found liable in tort law, 58 either
for procedural reasons, 59 because it would be difficult to prove a
causal connection between their speech and any patient injury, 60
or because of First Amendment protections. 61 Physicians who
refuse to treat unvaccinated patients are protected from suit by
the tort law principle that physicians have no duty to treat any

905, 912-21 (2021) (providing a history of physicians deceiving patients by using their own
sperm during artificial insemination, arguing for federal legislation to regulate and impose
criminal liability on such conduct, and noting that "[t]he difficulty in prosecuting primarily
arises from the lack of proper characterization of the doctor's behavior. Prosecutors don't
know what to qualify this crime as-is it assault, fraud, battery, a civil tort, a breach of
contract? The list of possibilities is seemingly endless and yet the crime may not perfectly
fit the elements of any of those offenses." (footnote omitted)); Dov Fox, Reproductive
Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 155-57 (2017) (writing that conduct which invades
reproductive and bodily autonomy, "however egregious or devastating, invades no 'legally
protected interest' [and] violates no right" because "[e]xisting causes of action lack the
narratives required" for plaintiffs to be heard in court, such as the proof of bodily harm
required for medical malpractice actions).

58.
While it is possible that physicians might be subject to professional disciplinary
action by state medical boards on these grounds, see Aldhous supra note 4, to date such
actions have been minimal; Geoff Brumfiel, A Doctor Spread COVID Misinformation and
Renewed Her License with a Mouse Click, NPR (Nov. 4, 2021, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.or
g/sections/health-shots/2021/11/04/1051873608/a-doctor-spread-covid-misinformation-andrenewed-her-license-with-a-mouse-click [https://perma.cc/LC7H-Z77N] (using Dr. Lee
Merritt, who spreads false information on COVID-19, as an example of how physicians are
not disciplined for exhibiting conduct which invites or requires formal disciplinary actions;
despite Dr. Merritt's false public statements, such as saying that vaccination increases risk
of death and that COVID-19 is a global conspiracy, Dr. Merritt has not been disciplined);
see also Two-Thirds of State Medical Boards See Increase in COVID-19 Disinformation
Complaints, FED'N ST. MED. BDS. (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.fsmb.org/advocacy/news-re

leases/two-thirds-of-state-medical-boards-see-increase-in-covid- 19-disinformation-complai
nts/ [https://perma.cc/9TRA-BA98] (providing statistics on complaints received by state
medical boards regarding physicians who spread false information, and finding that despite
a 67% increase in complaints related to the spread of false information, only twelve boards

have taken action); Victoria Knight, Will Doctors Who Are Spreading COVID-19
Misinformation Ever Face Penalty?, TIME (Sept. 20, 2021, 3:10 PM), https://time.com/60997
00/covid-doctors-misinformation/ [https://perma.cc/J8LF-HME3] (explaining structural
reasons for a lack of discipline by medical boards, and using a group of prominent
physicians, called the "Disinformation Dozen," who spread false COVID-19 information, as
an example).

59.
For example, to the extent that courts look to professional discipline as proof that
a doctor breached a duty in a tort action, they cannot do so until the medical board review
is complete. See Knight, supra note 58.
See Christopher P. Guzelian, True and False Speech, 51 B.C. L. REV. 669, 691-92
60.
(2010) (noting that to prove liability for a "speech tort, it must be known through empirical
evidence that speech caused the litigated injury," and offering examples of how judges "have
struggled to objectively adjudicate questions of speech causation").
61.
See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 34, 42 (2000) (discussing one of the leading commercial speech cases, Central
Hudson, then arguing it cannot be extended to provide a clear framework for analyzing the
constitutionality of commercial speech regulations); see also Claudia E. Haupt, Professional
Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1285-86 (2016) (explaining the interaction between First
Amendment protections on speech, professional standards, and tort liability for
malpractice).
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particular patient and may choose whether to enter into a doctorpatient relationship, 62 absent statutory requirements like the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). 63

Various statutes prohibit discrimination against patients on the
basis of protected classes like race, religion, and gender 64 but
either leave enforcement authority only in the hands of
government officials and offer no individual remedy 65 or impose
significant procedural and pleading barriers for those seeking
compensation. 66 Physicians who coerce or pressure birthing
women against their consent are occasionally sued, 6 7 but more
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 17, at 72-73, 278-79 (noting that formation of a
62.
doctor-patient relationship includes the contract law elements of offer and acceptance and
that physicians may decline to treat patients for any nondiscriminatory reason).
Under EMTALA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, any emergency room receiving
63.
federal funds must provide treatment and stabilizing services consistent with the hospital's
internal protocol and satisfactory ability to render those services, regardless of the patient's
ability to pay for care. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 17, at 279; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
64.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), 42 U.S.C. § 18116
(Section 18116 prohibits providers affiliated with covered entities and health programs
from discriminating on the basis of race, color, national origin, age, disability, or sex); see
also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737-38, 1740-42 (2020) (where the Court
considered a claim brought by a county employee who faced discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and held that the term "sex" as used in the Civil Rights Act includes
pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender-related discrimination). For a media-reported
example of a situation where statutory protections might apply, see John Eligon, Black
Doctor Dies of COVID-19 After Complaining of Racist Treatment, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/23/us/susan-moore-black-doctor-indiana.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/4L4V-W43J], which summarizes the attempts of Dr. Susan Moore, a Black
physician, to be heard and taken seriously by providers. After Dr. Moore was admitted to
the hospital for COVID-19 she reported her pain to a White physician, who "told her that
he felt uncomfortable giving her more narcotics ... and suggested that she would be
discharged." Dr. Moore was discharged to her home, and later passed away due to
COVID-19 related complications. Id.
65.
See Notification of Interpretation and Enforcement of Section 1557 of the
Affordable Care Act and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Fed. Reg. 27984
(May 10, 2021) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 86 and 45 C.F.R. 92) (placing enforcement
authority for section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act exclusively in the hands of HHS).
66.
See Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedure Hurdles in the Quest for
Justice, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621, 623 (2011) (explaining why pleading requirements create
an evidentiary hurdle that many plaintiffs alleging a civil rights violation cannot overcome).
67.
See Elizabeth Kukura, Obstetric Violence, 106 GEO. L.J. 721, 782-84, 788-89
(2018) (explaining that women who are pressured or coerced into undergoing a cesarean
section or other unwanted medical procedures often decline to file suit because tort claims
require showing the breach of a duty, and courts typically do not find the physician's
conduct breached the duty of care if the delivery was "successful"); see also Farah Diaz-Tello
& Lynn Paltrow, NAPW Working Paper: Birth Justice as Reproductive Justice 4 (May 2012)
(unpublished draft) (on file with the National Advocates for Pregnant Women) (discussing
the role of race in birth, and citing statistics that 80% of court-ordered cesareans were
performed on women of color and of those women 24% did not speak English as their first
language); Nadia N. Sawicki, Obstetric Battery, BILL HEALTH (Feb. 20, 2017), https:/
/blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/20/obstetric-battery/ [https://perma.cc/25MP-EH
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often than not attorneys are simply unwilling to take these cases

because

damages

are

limited.

68

Nonconsensual

pelvic

examinations clearly violate ethical principles relating to patients'
bodily autonomy, but because they are within the current
standard of medical practice, patients have limited opportunity for
tort recovery; this is why the trend has been towards legislative
intervention rather than litigation. 69 When ethics abuses arise in
the context of research, rather than clinical treatment, injured

participants have no avenue of recovery.7 0 And when patients are
sexually abused by their physicians, the consequences tend to be
criminal rather than civil; or alternatively, civil actions may be
taken against organizations that were aware of the abuse rather
than the physicians themselves.7 1
There are many reasons why patient claims for compensation
against physicians who have breached ethical duties are
unsuccessful. For example, this may be because plaintiffs are
seeking recovery for dignitary or emotional harms rather than
physical injuries (as in cases of discrimination). Tort law, however,
permits recovery for nonphysical harms only in narrow sets of

VT] (discussing possibilities for tort liability in the case of Kimberly Turbin, whose
physician, Dr. Abbassi, made twelve incisions against her vigorous objections to an
episiotomy); Rinat Dray Decision Proves How Hard It Is for Women Subjected to Forced
Surgeries to Get Justice, NAT'L ADVOC. FOR PREGNANT WOMEN (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.nationaladvocatesforpregnantwomen.org/rinat-dray-decision-proves-hard-wo

men-subjected-forced-surgeries-get-justice/ [https://perma.cc/K9DT-FCPK] (addressing the
case of Rinat Dray, who refused cesarean delivery but was forced to undergo surgery; this
was documented in her medical records, where the attending physician wrote "[t]he woman
has decisional capacity. I have decided to override her refusal to have a c-section.").
68.
Kukura, supra note 67, at 781-82 (noting that women who experience
mistreatment during childbirth have difficulty finding attorneys to take their case due to a
perception of "insufficient damages"); see Kimberly Seals Allers, Obstetric Violence Is a Real
Problem. Evelyn Yang's Experience Is Just One Example., WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2020/02/06/obstetric-violence-is-real-problem-ev
elyn-yangs-experience-is-just-one-example/ [https://perma.cc/Y8YD-4AHM] (discussing that
lawyers often decline obstetrical tort cases, which resulted in Kimberly Turbin meeting with
approximately eighty attorneys and crowdsourcing funding to retain counsel).

69.
See Phoebe Friesen et al., Legislative Alert: The Ban on Unauthorized Pelvic
Exams, 25 HEALTH L.J. 29-30 (2020) (summarizing the history of nonconsensual pelvic
exams performed while a patient is under anesthesia and the medical field's failure to
address this conduct, resulting in twenty-two bills across seventeen states intended to
address this harmful conduct, which is unethical but not tortious).
See Valerie Gutmann Koch, A Private Right of Action for Informed Consent in
70.
Research, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 173, 202-03, 206-07 (2015) (arguing that the duty to
secure informed consent and the cause of action for breach of this duty in clinical practice
should extend to securing informed consent in research).

See, e.g., Emily C. Hoskins, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: When Should
71.
Courts Find that Institutions Have a Duty to Protect Minor Children from Sexual Abuse?,
24 CHAP. L. REV. 487, 491-96 (2020) (discussing the Larry Nassar case and attempts to
hold institutional actors accountable).

1086

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[59:5

circumstances. 72 In cases where physical injuries do arise, attorneys
operating on a contingency fee basis are unlikely to accept cases
unless those injuries are significant enough to merit substantial
damages awards. 73 In other cases (including many involving
reproduction or end of life care), there may simply be no common

law cause of action that recognizes the harm as compensable. 74
And while a claim of breach of fiduciary duty seems as if it might
capture many such ethical violations, patients are rarely
successful in bringing such cases against their physicians. 75

It is, of course, true that some ethics violations may fall within
the scope of traditional common law causes of action like medical
malpractice or breach of confidentiality. However, while such
claims may be grounded in allegations that the defendant violated
ethical norms, courts are typically reluctant to acknowledge the
legal relevance of an ethical breach. 76 Common law recognizes

these traditional causes of action in a wide variety of contexts (not
exclusively medical contexts), and their prima facie elements can
be proven without reference to any independent ethical standards
applicable in the professional sphere. 77 For example, while a
doctor who publicly discloses sensitive information about a patient
72.
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 17, 98-99 (noting that dignitary or emotional
harm is a sufficient basis for recovery only as a separate claim for emotional distress, not
as a claim for malpractice); Erin Sheley, Rethinking Injury: The Case of Informed Consent,
2015 BYU L. REV. 63, 77 (2015) (criticizing the negligence and informed consent models as
allowing for recovery only when physical injury results); see also Tasnim Motala, Words
Still Wound: IIED & Evolving Attitudes Toward Racist Speech, 56 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
115, 120, 143 (2021) (arguing that the IIED cause of action does not adequately recognize
dignitary harms, using racist speech as an example of a dignitary harm which tort fails to
sufficiently remedy).
73.
Farah Diaz-Tello, Invisible Wounds: Obstetric Violence in the United States, 24
REPRO. HEALTH MATTERS, May 2016, at 56, 59 (citing the case of Kimberly Turbin, "who
captured an unconsented episiotomy on video and still had to consult nearly 80 attorneys
and crowdsource a pro se legal defence [sic] fund to file on her own before finding an
attorney who would pursue the case"); see Turbin v. Abbassi (Super. Ct., L.A. Cnty., Cal.,
Docket #BC580006 (2015)).
74.
See Fox, supra note 57, at 165-66, 217 (explaining that courts often refuse to
recognize wrongful birth and wrongful life claims based on the reasoning that no duty was
owed to the child or that without physical injury the duty of care was not breached); see
also Nadia N. Sawicki, A New Life for Wrongful Living, 58 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 279, 28385, 288-89 (2014) (discussing the failure of tort law to recognize claims for wrongful living,
where a provider renders care in contravention of the patient's wishes); Thaddeus Mason
Pope, Clinicians May Not Administer Life-Sustaining Treatment Without Consent: Civil,
Criminal, and DisciplinarySanctions, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 213, 218-19, 226-28
(2013) (explaining that patients have a right to refuse life-sustaining interventions, and
discussing recent recognition of the harms caused by rendering care against a patient's
wishes).
See infra Section III.A.4.
75.
76.
See infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.3.
See infra Section HI.B.3.
77.
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may be liable for breach of confidentiality, and may also have
violated professional ethical norms, the injured patient would

have a valid tort claim even if no such professional norms existed.
In medical malpractice cases involving physical injury, plaintiffs
are granted relief because they are able to demonstrate violations
of the standard of care regarding diagnosis, choice of treatment, or
execution of treatment. If one of those violations has occurred, the
fact that it also amounted to an ethical breach is viewed as legally
irrelevant. Thus, patients who suffer injury as a result of an
ethical violation may only recover if the circumstances of the
injury also fall within the narrow requirements of a common law
tort claim. Otherwise, tort law may provide little or no remedy,
even when clearly defined principles of medical ethics deem the
conduct a violation of the ethical standards of professional
practice.
A.

TraditionalForms of Recovery for PatientHarm

In this section, I introduce four traditional mechanisms by
which patients who are harmed in the health care context can seek
recovery. In the next section, I identify the various ways in which
courts approach cases where plaintiffs explicitly cite ethical
violations as a basis for recovery. Together, these discussions
suggest that courts are extremely reluctant to accept principles of
medical ethics as an independent basis for liability and patient
compensation.
1. Medical Malpractice. Medical malpractice law is the
primary source of recourse for patients who experience injuries in
connection with medical treatment. By bringing a medical
malpractice action, a patient can seek compensation for injuries
caused by a health care provider's failure to exercise the degree of
care expected under the circumstances. 7 8 Generally, the standard
of care in medical malpractice cases is defined by professional
custom and established by way of expert testimony. 79 By defining
"The liability of health care providers is governed by general negligence
78.
principles. Malpractice is usually defined as unskillful practice resulting in injury to the
patient, a failure to exercise the 'required degree of care, skill and diligence' under the
circumstances." FURROW ET AL., supra note 17, at 76.

79.
The standards for evaluating the delivery of professional medical services are not

normally established by either judge or jury. The medical profession itself sets the
standards of practice and the courts enforce these standards in tort suits.
Defendants trying to prove a standard of care normally present expert testimony
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the standard of care with reference to the "actual pattern of medical

practice," 80 as opposed to idealized standards 81 or practices confirmed
by clinical research to be most effective, 82 medical malpractice law
gives great deference to the judgment of the medical community. 83

In medical malpractice actions, the standard of care for
physicians is uniform and does not vary by geographic location,
experience, or degree of skill. 84 Given that medical training is
nationally standardized, most states require physicians to possess
"such medical knowledge as is commonly possessed or reasonably
available to minimally competent physicians in the same specialty
or general field of practice throughout the United States." 85 And

while "knowledge" is not limited to particular types of knowledgefor example, scholarly, technical, experiential, or social-the
describing the actual pattern of medical practice, without any reference to the
effectiveness of that practice. Most jurisdictions have traditionally given
professional medical standards conclusive weight, so that the trier of fact is not
allowed to reject the practice as improper.
Id. at 77-78. There are very limited exceptions to this rule. See id. at 78.
Id. at 77; see also Brian K. Cooke et al., The Elusive Standardof Care, 45 J. AM.
80.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 358, 358-63 (2017) (giving a history of the standard of care and
discussing the differences between the legal formulation of the standard of care and the
medical formulation of the standard of care).
81.
"A physician is not a guarantor of good results, nor is he required to exercise the
highest degree of care possible. As one court said, 'The physician will not be held to a
standard of perfection nor evaluated with benefit of hindsight."' FURROW ET AL., supra note
17, at 76; see also Peter Moffett & Gregory Moore, The Standard of Care:Legal History and
Definitions: The Bad and Good News, 12 W.J. EMERGENCY MED. 109, 109-11 (2011)
(discussing the history of law looking to medicine to define the standard of care, and arguing
that this erodes the ability of tort law to protect patients based on shifting definitions and
the low bar set by a physician-articulated definition of the standard of care).
82.

FURROW ET AL., supra note 17, at 77.

83.
But cf. James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and
the Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 1382, 1383-85, 1389-93 (1994) (examining the disadvantages of deferring to custom
to define the standard of care in medical malpractice cases); Sandra H. Johnson, Customary
Standardof Care:A Challengefor Regulation and Practice,HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.-Dec.
2013, at 9, 9-10 (arguing that deferring to the medical profession to define the standard of
care fails to consider the heterogenous nature of patients and the role of patient
decision-making in medical treatment).
84.
FURROW ET AL., supra note 17, at 77; cf. Marc D. Ginsberg, The Locality Rule
Lives! Why? UsingModern Medicine to Eradicatean Unhealthy Law, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 321,
333-35 (2013) (identifying only a few states that still define standards of care using the
locality rule instead of nationally consistent standards of care that do not vary across
geographic location).
85.
Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 870-71 (Miss. 1985); see also FURROW ET AL., supra
note 17, at 77 (citing Hall v. Hilbun as a good example of the view taken in most
jurisdictions); Meghan C. O'Connor, The Physician-Patient Relationship and the
Professional Standardof Care: Reevaluating Medical Negligence Principlesto Achieve the
Goals of Tort Reform, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 109, 120-23 (2010) (explaining that
many jurisdictions have adopted a national standard of care as adopted in Hall v. Hilbun
and analyzing the court's decision in that case).
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underlying bases of most successful medical malpractice actions
against physicians are errors in diagnosis, choice of treatment, or

execution of treatment. 86 If there were a simplified description of
these tort claims, it would be that they are about medical errors
resulting from deficiencies in technical knowledge, clinical
decision-making, or skill.
2. Informed Consent. Over time, it became clear that one
important part of the treatment process is the disclosure of risks
and benefits to patients so that they are able to make informed
decisions about their medical care. Patients have historically been
able to bring claims for battery in circumstances where a medical
treatment was provided without their consent, 87 but this action
was not available to patients who consented to treatment but
lacked key information that would help them make an informed
decision. 88 The new informed consent cause of action stepped in to

fill this gap. 89

In retrospect, the informed consent cause of action might be
viewed as an ethics-based tort remedy-that is, a legal cause of
action grounded in a breach of professional ethics (rather than
86.
The Institute of Medicine defines "medical error" as "the failure of a planned
action to be completed as intended (i.e., error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to
achieve an aim (i.e., error of planning)." INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A

SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 28 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). Medical errors are the most
common bases for medical malpractice suits. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and
Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024,
2025-28 (2006) (finding that obstetrics, surgery, missed or delayed diagnosis, and
medication are "key clinical areas of concern in research on patient safety" and account for
approximately 80% of U.S. malpractice claims; that 63% of malpractice cases involving
patient injury alleged medical error; that 73% of claims involving medical error received
compensation; and recognizing that the IOM's definition of error "is not synonymous with
the legal definition of negligence"); Adam C. Schaffer et al., Rates and Characteristicsof
Paid Malpractice Claims Among US Physicians by Specialty, 1992-2014, 177 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 710, 713 (2017) ("Across all paid claims, the most common type of allegation
was an error in diagnosis (31.8% ... ), followed by errors related to surgery (26.9% . .),
and errors related to medication or treatment (24.5% . . . )."); R.L. Phillips Jr. et al.,
Learningfrom MalpracticeClaims About Negligent, Adverse Events in Primary Care in the
United States, 13 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 121, 124 (2004) (identifying the most common
underlying causes of malpractice claims as diagnosis errors, failures to supervise or monitor
a case, improper performance of a procedure, and medication errors).
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 17, at 121-22.
87.
JESSIcA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
88.

PRACTICE 41-43 (2001) (describing the history of consent-based challenges to medical
treatment, and noting that "courts were willing to find that a patient had not provided valid
consent to treatment only in the most egregious circumstances"); FURROW ET AL., supra
note 17, at 122-23 (noting that the duty to secure informed consent is satisfied in most
jurisdictions even where the information provided to the patient on which the patient based
their decision was incomplete; medical malpractice and other tort causes of action do not
examine the sufficiency of information offered to a patient as an element of duty).
See BERG ET AL., supra note 88, at 43-46.
89.
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breaches of professional standards of diagnosis, treatment, or
skill). Today, the duty to secure a patient's informed consent is
perhaps the most well-recognized ethical and legal duty in the
medical profession. 90
An informed consent tort claim rests on the principle that
physicians have a duty to disclose relevant medical information
that would be material to a patient's decision about whether to

proceed with a particular medical treatment. Typically, this
requires disclosure of information about the patient's diagnosis
and prognosis, the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment,
and the risks and benefits of alternatives to that treatment
(including no treatment at all). 91 To secure a remedy under the
theory of informed consent, patients must prove that they suffered
physical harm as a result of the breached disclosure duty.92
Although an informed consent violation could be viewed

simply as a claim for medical malpractice-a breach of the medical
standard of care, specifically with respect to disclosure and
communication with patients-courts chose to view informed
consent claims as distinct from traditional medical malpractice
claims. 93 As a procedural result, lawsuits brought by patients

against physicians include separate
malpractice and informed consent. 94

causes

of action

for

The most surprising fact about the tort doctrine of informed
consent is that, unlike medical malpractice law, it was not
90.
See id. at 14 (describing informed consent as "a cornerstone doctrine of
contemporary medical ethics and health law in the United States"); AMA Code of Med.
Ethics: Consent, Commc'n, & Decision Making, Op. E-2.1.1 (describing "[i]nformed consent
to medical treatment" as being "fundamental in both ethics and law").
91.
FURROW ET AL., supra note 17, at 125-26; BERG ET AL., supra note 88, at 53-61.
92.
The requirements for proving causation in fact and proximate causation in
informed consent cases actually differ significantly from those in medical malpractice cases.
BERG ET AL., supra note 88, at 133-34, 136-41 (discussing differences in the causation
requirements for malpractice and informed consent cases and describing informed consent's
required elements of "injury-causation" and "[d]ecision-causation").
93.
Id. at 42-46 (describing the development of the informed consent cause of action
as separate from claims for battery or medical malpractice); id. at 133-34 (comparing
contemporary informed consent claims to "early informed consent cases [that] were brought
as professional negligence cases").
94.
Id. at 62 (describing a Georgia Supreme Court case addressing both informed
consent and malpractice claims); BETH HOLLIDAY, CAUSES OF ACTION: 49 COA 2D § 3 (2011)
(describing informed consent claims as being brought in addition to traditional malpractice
claims); 61 AM. JUR. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 148 (2022) ('There is no
unanimity as to which theory of recovery a plaintiff must adopt if his or her claim involves
a failure by a physician to adequately disclose the risks and alternatives of a proposed
diagnostic, therapeutic, or surgical procedure. A patient has three avenues of tort relief
against a doctor: (1) deviation from the standard of care (medical malpractice); (2) lack of
informed consent; and (3) battery.").
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historically grounded in the customary practices of the profession,
nor was it grounded in established principles of medical ethics.
Until the 1950s, neither American law nor medical practice
required physicians to make any disclosures when securing a
patient's consent to treatment. 95 Leading historians of medicine
and medical ethics conclude that prior to this time, as a matter of
medical custom, physicians did not share information with

patients in order to secure their informed consent-in fact, they
frequently withheld it. 96 According to Jay Katz's foundational
history, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, "disclosure and
consent, except in the most rudimentary fashion, [were]
obligations alien to medical thinking and practice." 97 In short,
prior to the 1950s, informed consent was not a part of medical
custom, and there was no common law precedent for it.
And yet, within a matter of decades, the duty of physicians to
make disclosures to patients as part of securing their informed
consent became well established in both law and medicine. 98 What
drove this turn of events? There are various reasons, such as the
recognition of consent as an essential element of medical research
in the post-World War II Nuremberg trials, 99 development of the
patient rights movement,100 the growth and standardization of
See BERG ET AL., supranote 88, at 41-44 (describing the history of consent-based
95.
challenges to medical treatment and noting that "courts were willing to find that a patient
had not provided valid consent to treatment only in the most egregious circumstances").
96.
Id. at 42 ("Early medical practice codes did not speak of consent-it was more
likely that a physician would conceal his actions from the patient than seek his or her
consent to treatment."); see also JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 1-

3 (Johns Hopkins Press 2002) (noting that doctors historically viewed patients as being "in
need of caring custody," and that they were obligated to attend to the patient's needs "on
their own authority, without consulting with their patients about the decisions that needed
to be made").
97.

KATZ, supra note 96, at 1.

See id. at 2-3; BERG ET AL., supra note 88, at 44-46.
98.
See George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg
99.
Code - Human Rights in Human Experimentation, 305 INT. REV. RED CROSS 227, 227-28
(1995) (describing how Nazi atrocities led to the development of the Nuremberg Code and
explaining that the Code did not reflect or support modern practices at the time); see also
George

J. Annas,

Beyond Nazi

War Crime Experiments: The

Voluntary Consent

Requirement of the Nuremberg Code at 70, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 42, 42-46 (2017)
(discussing the limitations of the consent requirement created by the Nuremberg Code,
because the Code does not articulate what is, and how to obtain, informed consent).
See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons
100.
from Medical Consumerism and the Patients'Rights,Women's Health and Disability Rights
Movements, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 147, 150-53 (1994) (describing the patient rights movement
that began in the 1950s); Christine Laine & Frank Davidoff, Patient-CenteredMedicine: A
Professional Evolution, 275 JAMA 152, 153-54 (1996) (describing the evolution of the
patient rights movement in medicine pertaining to patient care, health-related law, medical
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medical ethics, 101 and the growing recognition of autonomy as a
principle

of patient

decision-making.

102

But

from

a legal

perspective, the law of informed consent developed because judges
made it so. 103 Without any clear common law precedent, judges
around the country uniformly accepted this new legal duty, which
arose hand in hand with its recognition as an ethical duty in
medical practice. 104 Courts recognized a gap in patient protection
and used tort law to fill that gap. 105

3.
ethical

Confidentiality. Physicians
duty

to maintain

their

unquestionably
patients'

have

an

confidentiality. 106

However, leading scholars of tort law and medical law conclude
that there is no uniform legal approach to recognizing the duty of
confidentiality and providing a remedy for its breach (whether in
the context of the doctor-patient relationship or otherwise). 107
education, research, and quality assessment); Jonathan F. Will, A Brief Historical and
Theoretical Perspective on Patient Autonomy and Medical Decision Making, 139 CHEST
1491, 1491, 1495-96 (2011) (analyzing changes in medicine in the latter half of the
twentieth century, including questioning of a physician's authority and growth of patient
autonomy); BERG ET AL., supra note 88, at 21 (describing the patient rights movement of
the 1960s and 1970s).
101.
The AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics in their modern form were formalized in
1957, and the AMA's Judicial Council (now the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs) was
tasked with issuing interpretive opinions about specific ethical issues. AM. MED. ASS'N,
History of the Code (2017), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/mediabrowser/public/ethics/ama-code-ethics-history.pdf [https://perma.ec/9B7P-BP85].
102.
See generally BERG ET AL., supra note 88, at 11-12, 20-21.
103.
At least some scholars argue that attorneys and judges created the duty of
informed consent out of whole cloth, without any meaningful support or reflection in actual
medical practice See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 96, at 2-3 (describing that judicial
decision-making in the area of informed consent was not based on the medical profession's
customary practice, and was in fact a "radical break with medical practices ... [for] more
than two thousand years of recorded medical history").
104.
BERG ET AL., supra note 88, at 46-47 (explaining that there was no professional
custom of disclosure at the time that courts first began imposing a duty to secure informed
consent).
105.
Modern commentators have argued for the extension of tort law even further,
based on changing practices and the changing nature of treatment and research
relationships. See, e.g., Valerie Gutmann Koch, A Private Right of Action for Informed
Consent in Research, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 173, 177 (2015) (proposing "thatthe ethical
duty to disclose research findings . . . supports a private right of action for research
participants").
106.
See Confidentiality: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 3.2.1, AM. MED. ASS'N,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/confidentiality [https://perma.cc/KKW2-6
A2W] (last visited Feb. 20, 2022) (discussing confidentiality).
107.
See Cause of Action Against Physician or Other Health Care Practitioner for
Wrongful Disclosure of Confidential Patient Information, 36 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 299
(2008) [hereinafter Cause of Action] (identifying three legal theories that patients use in
asserting a common law action against a health care provider who wrongfully disclosed
patient information: "tortious breach of a duty of confidentiality ... breach of a contractual
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Only some jurisdictions recognize an independent tort cause of
action for breach of confidentiality by health care providers.108
Others view confidentiality as one of the core duties owed by
fiduciaries and allow injured parties to seek recovery by bringing

a claim on those grounds.1 09 Some consider confidentiality to be
duty of confidentiality . .. and invasion of privacy," and also noting that some jurisdictions
may not recognize this as a tortious breach of duty); 116 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d §§ 2,
6-8 (2010) (citing fiduciary duty, breach of contract, medical malpractice, negligence, and
invasion of privacy as possible avenues for recovery when a doctor breaches a duty of
confidentiality to their patient); Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence:An Emerging
Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1437 (1982) ("Most courts ... have resorted to a confused
tangle of legal theories, including invasion of privacy, implied term of contract, implied
private cause of action in statute, and tortious breach of confidence, to make out a cause of

action in such situations."); see also Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977)
(in considering a claim against a physician for breach of confidence, concluding that "[w]hat
label we affix to this wrong is unimportant," and citing Prosser for the proposition that
"there is no necessity whatever that a tort must have a name. New and nameless torts are

being recognized constantly"); Smith v. Driscoll, 162 P. 572, 572 (Wash. 1917) (finding that
it is not "necessary to pursue at length the inquiry of whether a cause of action lies in favor

of a patient against a physician for wrongfully divulging confidential communications," and
holding that "it will be assumed that, for so palpable a wrong, the law provides a remedy");
Martin v. Baehler, Civ. A. No. 91C-11-008, 1993 WL 258843, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 20,
1993) (in discussing claims for breach of confidentiality, noting that some courts "hold the
nature of the cause of action sounds in contract, while the majority holds it lies in tort");
McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 436 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) ('"The jurisdictions that
recognize the duty of confidentiality have relied on various theories for the cause of action,
including invasion of privacy, breach of implied contract, medical malpractice, and breach
of a fiduciary duty or a duty of confidentiality."); Haddad v. Gopal, 787 A.2d 975, 981 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2001) (in allowing a case to proceed as a claim of "breach of physician-patient
confidentiality," noting that patients "are aware of the promises of discretion contained in
the Hippocratic Oath and must be able to rely on those promises").
See, e.g., Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 533 (Or. 1985)
108.
(holding that "unauthorized and unprivileged disclosure of confidential information
obtained in a confidential relationship can give rise to tort damages" and that establishing
such a cause of action does not require "judicial innovation"); Martin, 1993 WL 258843, at
*2, *4-5 (in a case of first impression, holding that the breach of a physician's duty of
confidentiality "constitutes a tort and damages therefore may be recovered at law," and
concluding that the complaint at issue "states a cause of action in tort for breach of
confidentiality"); Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999) ("[A]n
independent tort exists for the unauthorized, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of
nonpublic medical information that a physician or hospital has learned within a physicianpatient relationship."); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Mass. 1985) ("[A] duty of
confidentiality arises from the physician-patient relationship and that a violation of that
duty, resulting in damages, gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort against the
physician."); McCormick, 494 S.E.2d at 437 ("[A]n actionable tort lies for a physician's
breach of the duty to maintain the confidences of his or her patient in the absence of a
compelling public interest or other justification for the disclosure.").
109.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

§ 874,

reporter's note (AM. L. INST. 1979) ("One breach of fiduciary duty that is more commonly
regarded as giving rise to an action in tort is the disclosure of confidential information.");
32 AM. JUR. TRIALS 105 § 3 (1985) ("The most conceptually sound rationale for the breach
of the confidential relationship theory rests on the fiduciary character of the relationship
between a doctor and a patient." (emphasis omitted)); see also Tighe v. Ginsberg, 146 A.D.2d
268, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that a patient's claim against a physician for breach
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part of the implied contract between doctor and patient and may
grant recovery based on contract principles. 110 A few accept claims
for breach of doctor-patient confidentiality within the context of a
common law or statutory malpractice action.1 11 Others completely

reject a common law cause of action for breach of confidence
between a doctor and patient. 112
Because there is no uniformly accepted common law cause of
action for breach of confidence, courts that award recovery for
of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality sounds in negligence, not medical malpractice); cf.
Cause of Action, supra note 107, § 3 (noting that most patients seeking a remedy for
confidentiality breaches rely on the "tort theory that the defendants breached a fiduciary
duty" and some jurisdictions may not recognize such claims).
110.
See, e.g., Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 832 (Ala. 1973) (finding no cases
rejecting "a cause of action for the breach of an implied contract of confidentiality on the
part of the doctor," and citing "public knowledge of the ethical standards of the medical
profession" as constituting "sufficient justification for reasonable expectation on a patient's
part that the physician has promised to keep confidential all information given by the
patient"); Doe, 93 Misc. 2d at 210-11 (finding that the formation of a physician-patient
relationship establishes a contract "to retain in confidence matter[s] which should be kept
in confidence," which can be "enforced by injunction and compensated in damages"); Leger
v. Spurlock, 589 So. 2d 40, 43 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that "the cause of action for
breach of patient-physician confidentiality is based in implied contract and tort" and that
such a claim "alleges malpractice and is subject to the requirements of the Medical
Malpractice Act"); cf. Geisberger v. Willuhn, 390 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (noting
that the statutory protection for breach of a confidential relationship is "probably
co-extensive" with "a cause of action for the breach of an implied contract not to disclose
confidential information acquired through the physician-patient relationship").
111.
See, e.g., Leger, 589 So. 2d at 43 (holding that "the cause of action for breach of
patient-physician confidentiality is based in implied contract and tort" and that such a
claim "alleges malpractice and is subject to the requirements of the Medical Malpractice
Act"); Saur v. Probes, 476 N.W.2d 496, 497-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing grant of
defendant's motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice suit, and concluding
that "a cause of action exists for a psychiatrist's disclosure of privileged communications");
Berger v. Sonneland, 26 P.3d 257, 267-68 (Wash. 2001) (holding that a claim for breach of
confidentiality can be brought under the state's medical malpractice statute, but only if the
disclosure is made in the context of "health care"). Contra Martin, 1993 WL 258843, at *45 (holding that breach of confidentiality is not encompassed within the Delaware medical
malpractice statute).
112.
See, e.g., Judy E. Zelin, Physician's Tort Liability for Unauthorized Disclosure of
Confidential Information About Patient, 48 A.L.R.4TH 668 § 7 (1986) ("In a few
jurisdictions, the courts have held that liability for a physician's unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information about a patient cannot be based upon a breach of the confidential
relationship of physician and patient, where the particular jurisdiction follows the
common-law rule that neither patient nor physician has a privilege that a communication
of one to the other not be disclosed to a third party, and has no statute providing for such a
privilege."); Geisberger, 390 N.E.2d at 946 (noting that Illinois common law does not
recognize a privilege for confidential communication between a doctor and a patient but
does provide statutory protections for some disclosures); Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp.
322, 324 (S.D. Ga. 1957) (holding that in the absence of a statute, "[t]here is no confidential
relationship between doctor and patient or hospital and patient in Georgia"); Allen v.
Smith, 368 S.E.2d 924, 928 (W. Va. 1988) (expressing "reluctan[ce] to recogniz[ing] a
general cause of action for the unauthorized disclosure of medical records in the absence of
conduct so outrageous as to shock the conscience"); Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249,
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breach of doctor-patient confidentiality most commonly rely on
public policy arguments to justify their holdings. One court that
adopted a tort cause of action for breach of doctor-patient
confidentiality noted that:
[I]n the absence of legislation, courts have found the basis for
a right of action for breach of the physician-patient
confidential relationship in four main sources of public
policy: state physician licensing statutes, evidentiary rules
and privileged communication statutes which prohibit a
physician from testifying in judicial proceedings, common
law principles of trust, and the Hippocratic oath and
principles of medical ethics. 113
Indeed, several jurisdictions, in explaining the public policy
supporting the physician's duty of confidentiality, explicitly cite
the ethical commitments of the medical profession, including the
Hippocratic Oath and the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics. 1 4
That said, there is no single, universally recognized tort cause of
251 (Tenn. 1965) (holding that although "physicians and surgeons are required by the ethics
of their profession to preserve the secrets of their patients . . . under the common law,
applicable in this case, this ethical requirement is not enforceable by law").
113.
Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 590, 592 (D.C. 1985).
114.
See, e.g., Horne, 287 So. 2d at 829 (in discussing public policy factors supporting
a cause of action for breach of patient confidentiality, identifying as relevant the state
medical licensing statute that authorizes professional discipline upon a doctor "who
wilful[ly] betray[s] ... a professional secret", "the established ethical code of the medical
profession itself [the Hippocratic Oath] unequivocally recognizes the confidential nature of
the doctor-patient relationship," and the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics); Martin, 1993
WL 258843, at *3 (in holding that an "actionable wrong lies for a physician's breach of his
or her duty to maintain confidences," citing the Hippocratic Oath and the AMA's Principles
of Medical Ethics, as well as the state medical practice act which finds that a willful
violation of confidentiality "constitutes unprofessional conduct by a medical doctor or
surgeon"); Vassiliades, 492 A.2d at 591-92 (in adopting a cause of action for breach of a
confidential relationship, citing the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics's professional
recognition "that the relationship between a physician and patient requires that '[t]he
confidences... should be held as a trust and should never be revealed except when
imperatively required by the laws of the state"' (quoting PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS

OF A.M.A., Ch. II, § 1 (1943)); MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 483, 485 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1982) (in supporting an implied contract theory for breach of confidence, finding that
"the confidentiality of the relationship is a cardinal rule of the medical profession, faithfully
adhered to in most instances, and thus has come to be justifiably relied upon by patients
seeking advice and treatment"); McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 435 (S.C. Ct. App.
1997) (in finding a tort cause of action for a physician's breach of patient confidentiality,
noting that "[t]he belief that physicians should respect the confidences revealed by their
patients in the course of treatment is a concept that has its genesis in the Hippocratic
Oath"); Haddad v. Gopal, 787 A.2d 975, 981 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (in allowing a case to
proceed as a claim of "breach of physician-patient confidentiality," noting that patients "are
aware of the promises of discretion contained in the Hippocratic Oath and must be able to
rely on those promises"); see also McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 512 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law. Div. 1979) (discussing exceptional circumstances in which physicians are permitted
to breach the duty of confidentiality and noting that state common law is "consonant with
§ 9 of the Principlesof Medical Ethics").
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action for breach of confidentiality, either in the medical context

or beyond.
4. FiduciaryDuty. A claim for breach of fiduciary duty was
historically an action in equity, rather than tort. 115 However, in
the context of professional practice by attorneys and physicians,
courts treat many fiduciary duty claims simply as "a species of

malpractice." 116 While there are important procedural and
substantive differences between claims for breach of fiduciary duty
grounded in equity versus negligence,1 17 they will not be explored

here.
Fiduciary relationships are ones that depend on trust between
the parties, where the party in a stronger position-with greater

power, knowledge, and expertise-owes a duty of loyalty and care
to those they serve. 118 The duty of loyalty requires acting for the

benefit of the beneficiary, without influence by personal motives
or self-interest. 119 That includes a duty of candor, requiring

complete honesty towards the beneficiary, and full disclosure of
information needed for the beneficiary to make appropriate
decisions. 12 0 It also includes a duty of confidentiality, which may
See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 724 (2d ed. 2011).
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
§ 874 (AM. L. INST. 1979) ("One standing in a fiduciary relation with another is subject to
liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the relation.");
RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 15:3 (2022 ed.) ("In defining the tort of legal
malpractice, one approach is to include the fiduciary obligations within the standard of
care.").
117.
See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
118.
See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 800-01
(1983); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 115, §§ 696-697.
119.
Frankel, supra note 118, at 824 ("[M]uch of fiduciary law is designed to prevent
the fiduciary from using delegated power to further interests other than those of the
entrustor."). In the medical context, the duty of loyalty is most often tested in situations
where a physician has a financial (or other) conflict of interest that might affect their
medical judgment-for example, as where physicians are incentivized by managed care
organizations to limit costly diagnostic tests and treatments. See Sam F. Halabi, Against
Fiduciary Utopianism: The Regulation of Physician Conflicts of Interest and Standardsof
Care, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 433, 445-47, 462 (2020) (discussing duties of loyalty in
medicine, including conflicts of interest); Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 463, 504 (2002) ("[M]ost courts have declined to allow suits for damages for breach
of fiduciary duties based on financial incentives, even though courts recognize the obvious
force that fiduciary principles have in doctor-patient relationships and that these
principles are generally hostile to financial conflicts of interest.").
120.
See 18B AM. JUR. 2D CORPORATIONS § 1469 (2022) (describing the duty of candor
as being "encompassed within the duty of loyalty"); Kate Whitlock, Loyalty and Care:
Separate but Equal Duties, DRI FOR DEF., Apr. 2018, at 26 (describing fiduciary duties of
disclosure and candor as "really just different iterations of the core duty of loyalty"); J.
115.
116.

ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE

§

11.01 (3d ed. 2016)
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continue even after the fiduciary relationship has ended. 121 The
fiduciary's duty of care is similar to the standard of care in
medicine and is dependent on context.122 Each of these duties has
distinctly moral components.1 23
Academic commentators commonly describe the physicianpatient relationship as a fiduciary relationship12 4 grounded in the

("Early in the development of the doctrine, confusion existed over the precise source of the
disclosure obligation. Some cases viewed the board's duties as freestanding, separate from
the other fiduciary obligations. Courts, however, have made clear that the duty of complete
disclosure is a subset of both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty."). In the medical
context, the duty of candor encompasses the duty to secure a patient's informed consent,
Halabi, supra note 119, at 447, the duty to disclose financial conflicts of interest, id. at 44748, and according to some, disclosure of other information about the physician that might
impact the patients' decision-making, Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernized Informed Consent:
Expanding the Boundaries of Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 850-51 (2016).
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 115, § 696. The physician's duty to maintain a
121.
patient's confidentiality is recognized as being grounded in the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
Halabi, supra note 119, at 440-41; Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 354 (Fla. 2002) ("These
cases are also persuasive authority and support our conclusion that a psychotherapist who
has created a fiduciary relationship with his client owes that client a duty of confidentiality,
and that a breach of such duty is actionable in tort." (footnote omitted)); see also Domako v.
Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Mich. 1991) (holding that the duty of confidentiality may be
waived once a patient files a malpractice action and authorizes the release of medical
information); Parris v. Limes, 277 P.3d 1259, 1265 n.3 (Okla. 2012) ("Oklahoma has long
recognized that the relationship between a physician and patient is a fiduciary and
confidential relationship.").
See Halabi, supra note 119, at 440. The fiduciary duty of care in the medical
122.
context overlaps significantly with the duty of care as understood in medical malpractice
contexts. Professor Halabi describes the doctor's fiduciary duty of care as including the
"obligation to perform their professional activities carefully and competently, generally as
judged by the prevailing standards of professional competence in the relevant field of
medicine." Id. at 449. He notes that while courts acknowledge the physician's duty of care
as being fiduciary in nature, these claims are "typically adjudicated as malpractice actions."
Id.
See Frankel, supra note 118, at 829-30 ("Courts regulate fiduciaries by imposing
123.
a high standard of morality upon them. This moral theme is an important part of fiduciary
law."); id. at 829-32 (discussing morality as an element of fiduciary principles more
generally). However, because the duty of candor/disclosure has special manifestations in
the context of medical practice (informed consent), for the purposes of this Article I treat it
separately.

Halabi, supranote 119, at 437 (describing the doctor-patient relationship as "one
124.
of the storied fiduciary relationships in law"); Charity Scott, Doctors as Advocates, Lawyers
as Healers, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y, 331, 335, 337 (2008) (noting that "[t]he concept
of the physician as a fiduciary for his patient has a long and honorable history in medical
ethics," and that this concept has become "well accepted" in U.S. law); Marc A. Rodwin,
Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a
ChangingHealth Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 242, 245-46 (1995) (noting that the
"dominant metaphor in medical ethics and law today" is that of the physician as fiduciary,
and describing how the physician-patient relationship closely resembles classic fiduciary
relationships); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why PhysiciansAre Fiduciariesfor Their Patients, 12
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) ("The relationship between patients and physicians
certainly seems to fit . .. [the] conditions [of a fiduciary relationship].").
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ethical obligations of the medical profession. 125 Courts, too,
frequently use fiduciary language in describing the physicianpatient relationship. 1 26 Professor Maxwell Mehlman, for example,

cites dozens and dozens of cases to reinforce the fact that
"numerous courts ... acknowledge the fiduciary nature of the
patient-physician relationship." 1 2 7 He also notes that common law

in only three states has explicitly rejected this categorization. 12 8
That said, while courts may describe the physician-patient
relationship as fiduciary, it is much less common for them to
actually recognize breach of fiduciary duty as a viable cause of

action when patients sue their physicians. Numerous legal
scholars have concluded that, in practice, courts very rarely accept
fiduciary duty claims in the medical context. 129 This may be in part
due to the fact that even if physicians owe fiduciary duties to
patients, the scope of those duties as a legal matter is poorly

defined.13 0 While Professor Mehlman challenges the sources that
"cast doubt on or reject outright the fiduciary nature of the
patient-physician relationship,"131 he does seem to recognize a
difference between judicial acknowledgment of a fiduciary
125.
Dayna Bowen Matthew, Implementing American Health Care Reform: The
FiduciaryImperative, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 715, 730 (2011) ("Current applications of fiduciary
law are pervasive in the medical context and are firmly based on the well-established
ethical responsibilities that providers historically owed to their patients."); Rodwin, supra
note 124, at 245-47 (discussing medical ethics as a basis for the fiduciary role); Mehlman,
supra note 124, at 7-8 (citing the AMA Council on Ethical and Jud. Affairs, Code of Ethics,
Principles of Medical Ethics).
126.
See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Can Law Save Medicine?, 36 J. LEGAL MED. 121, 13839 (2015) (citing Crispell v. Dubois, 4 Barb. 393, 1848 WL 5096 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1848)).
127.
Mehlman, supra note 124, at 3-7.
128.
Id. at 22-23.
129.
Scott, supra note 124, at 338 n.10 ("Despite this broad legal and ethical consensus,
some cases and commentary have challenged the characterization of the doctor-patient
relationship as a fiduciary one."); MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS:

PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 210 (1993) (noting that "courts apply fiduciary law
principles to doctors" in only "a few situations," describing those as "limited
circumstances"); Rodwin, supra note 124, at 242, 246-47 (noting that "although doctors
perform fiduciary-like roles and hold themselves out as fiduciaries in their ethical codes,
the law holds doctors accountable as fiduciaries only in restricted situations," such as those
involving patient abandonment, confidentiality, informed consent, and disclosure of
financial interests in the context of clinical research); Halabi, supra note 119, at 452
("Despite the lofty rhetoric courts attach to the fiduciary relationship between physicians
and patients, they have been largely reluctant to enforce fiduciary duties, per se, against
physicians.").
130.
Scott, supra note 124, at 339; see also Hall, supra note 119, at 490-91 (discussing
the fact that "fiduciary law does not consist of an integrated body of concrete rules or precise
doctrines that applies uniformly to all forms of fiduciary relationships").
131.
Mehlman, supra note 124, at 10. In particular, Professor Mehlman challenges as
"unsupported" Professor Marc Rodwin's claims in MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS
regarding courts' rejection of fiduciary duty claims. Id. at 18-20.
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relationship and courts' willingness to grant recovery on the basis
of this relationship. For example, he points out that that courts in

ten states, "while acknowledging or at least not rejecting the
fiduciary nature of the relationship, have held that a patient has
no cause of action for breach of a physician's fiduciary duties that
is distinct from an action for medical malpractice." 1 32 In Neade v.
Portes, for example, the Supreme Court of Illinois found that while
"Illinois courts have recognized a fiduciary relationship between a
physician and his patient, [they] have never recognized a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty against a physician" and indeed
have rejected breach of fiduciary duty claims brought against
attorneys. 133
There are two reasons why courts are hesitant to grant
recovery for breach of a physician's fiduciary duty. The most
common explanation judges offer for rejecting fiduciary duty
claims in the context of medical practice is that such claims are
duplicative of medical malpractice claims. 134 Many courts conclude 135
that claims for malpractice and claims for breach of fiduciary duty
are "based on the same operative facts and result in the same
injury to the plaintiff,"1 36 and that in such cases, the malpractice
claim provides a sufficient remedy. 137 Only in rare situations
132.
Id. at 23.
Neade v. Portes, 793 N.E.2d 496, 500 (Ill. 2000) (citations omitted).
133.
134.
See Halabi, supra note 119, at 449-50 ("For attorneys, physicians, and many
other fiduciaries, courts have equated breaches of the fiduciary duty of care with
malpractice, imposing ordinary negligence and preponderance of the evidence standards
when adjudicating claims by beneficiaries."); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 115 ("In a number

of states, where a legal malpractice claim and a breach of fiduciary duty claim are joined in
the same case and are based on exactly the same underlying lawyer misconduct and seek
the same damages, the latter will be dismissed as redundant."); Hall, supra note 119, at
493 (noting that in cases of financial conflicts of interest, courts "have resisted efforts to
craft legal theories based on fiduciary law that would circumvent conventional medical
malpractice standards"); see also MALLEN, supra note 116 (citing the same approach in

cases of legal malpractice); Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., FiduciaryDuty,
Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 235
(1993) (citing the same approach in cases of legal malpractice, noting that many courts
"refuse to recognize the distinctions and dichotomies between and among the actions, and
conclude that regardless of how the cause is characterized it is essentially a tort action for
malpractice").

135.
Professor Halabi concludes that this may be because common law tort claims
"often have advantageous features from the perspective of trial judges" as compared to
claims for breach of fiduciary duty. Halabi, supra note 119, at 453.
136.
Neade, 739 N.E.2d at 500.
137.
Id.; see also D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 171-72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(refusing to "ignore the requirements of medical malpractice law and recognize a new tort
based on breach of fiduciary duty to cover the wrong perpetrated by a physician" with
financial conflicts of interest); Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 497 (Ariz. 1978) (concluding

1100

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[59:5

where the underlying facts of a medical malpractice action and a
fiduciary duty action are obviously distinguishable will courts

permit a breach of fiduciary duty claim to proceed separately. 138
Many academic commentators

have rightly criticized courts'

conflation of the two causes of action, pointing to important
differences with respect to pleadings, burdens of proof, expert
testimony, defenses, and remedies. 1 39 According to Professor Mehlman,
"physicians technically can breach their fiduciary duty even if the
care that they provided meets the standard of care for
negligence." 140
A second reason why courts might be resistant to viewing a

physician's breach as a breach of fiduciary duty rather than a
medical duty of care is skepticism that the plaintiff's motivation in
making such a pleading is simply to avoid the onerous standards
many states impose on medical malpractice claims. 141 In
particular, malpractice claims tend to have shorter statutes of

limitations, so patients whose injuries could be interpreted as
being caused by a breach of fiduciary duty have a strategic reason
for bringing that claim instead. 142
that the doctor-patient relationship is a fiduciary one, but declining to "recognize a new
cause of action based on breach of trust when an adequate remedy for this case already
exists"); Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 222-23 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a
physician has a fiduciary duty "of full and fair disclosure" but that breach of this duty in
the medical context constitutes a negligence cause of action); Kernke v. Menninger Clinic,
Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1354 (D. Kan. 2001) (refusing to allow a plaintiff to '"creatively
classify' a claim as something other than one for medical malpractice if the substance of the
claim concerns the physician-patient relationship"). But see Moore v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a physician's failure to disclose his
economic interests in future research before securing consent to medical treatment could
"properlybe characterized [as] either [a] breach of a fiduciary duty ... or, alternatively, as
the performance of medical procedures without first having obtained the patient's informed
consent").
138.
See, e.g., In re Odeh, 431 B.R. 807, 810, 812-13 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010)
(distinguishing between a medical malpractice claim for negligent treatment of cardiac
arrest and a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on the defendant's alteration of the
plaintiff's medical records to hide evidence of the malpractice).
139.
Mehlman, supra note 124, at 26-31, 44 n.92; Anderson & Steele, supra note 134,
at 251-61; Halabi, supra note 119, at 453.
140.
Mehlman, supra note 124, at 30 ("For example, the physician may have made a
mistake that was reasonable but that could have been avoided had the physician not acted
out of self-interest. Alternatively, the physician may have deprived the patient of care that,
while reasonable, would have been of even higher quality had the physician not acted selfinterestedly.").
141.
Id. at 22-23.
142.
Id. at 23; MALLEN, supra note 116; see also Brown, 570 N.W.2d at 171 ("We decline
to create a new cause of action simply to permit the putative class to avoid showing injury
or to circumvent the legislatively mandated statute of limitations."); Colton v. Dewey, 321
N.W.2d 913, 917 (Neb. 1982) ("[A]ny professional misconduct or any unreasonable lack of
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Tort Claims Based on Ethical Violations

While a comprehensive survey of the caselaw is beyond the
scope of this Article, this section provides an overview of three
distinct approaches that courts tend to take when addressing legal
claims that are explicitly grounded in breaches of medical ethics.
These caselaw examples are intended to be representative, but by
no means exhaustive. 143
In most cases where patients specifically allege that they are
injured as a result of a health care professional's deviation from
principles of medical ethics-rather than deviations from
technical knowledge, professional decision-making, or skillcourts deny injured plaintiffs a remedy under traditional theories

of medical malpractice. Indeed, courts often go out of their way to
explain why medical malpractice is not an appropriate framing for
claims based on ethical violations. Moreover, patients who seek
compensation for ethical violations by way of other types of tort
actions-for battery, informed consent, breach of fiduciary duty,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of confidentiality, fraud,
etc.-are often denied remedies as well.
As a general matter, courts uniformly reject the idea that
ethical standards establish a legal duty of care or that breach of
professional ethical duties is dispositive on the issue of legal
breach. 144 However, some courts recognize that professional
ethical standards may have some relevance in litigation-either as
persuasive evidence regarding the professional standard of care or
as part of the policy analysis regarding whether recovery should
be granted. 145 Other courts, in contrast, reject the idea that ethical
standards could be relevant in any way to the disposition of legal
claims. 146 Taken as a whole, these cases show a gap in tort law's
ability to remedy harms resulting from unethical conduct by
physicians and other health care providers.

skill or fidelity in the performance of professional or fiduciary duties is 'malpractice' and
comes within the professional or malpractice statute of limitations.").
The Author's research relied upon Westlaw searches of cases citing to ethics
143.
opinions of professional medical associations as well as the published version of the AMA's
Code of Medical Ethics, which is annotated with references to court cases that cite to the
AMA Code or to Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs (CEJA) Opinions.
See infra Part IV.
144.
See infra Section IV.B; see also supra text accompanying notes 113-14 (regarding
145.
policy considerations in confidentiality cases); infra note 179.
See infra Part IV.
146.
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Ethical Standards Do Not Establish a Legal Duty. Some

patient-plaintiffs in tort suits have argued that health care

providers have a duty to comply with the ethical standards of the
profession, and therefore that a breach of these ethical standards
is an independent basis for tort liability. 147 As a procedural matter,
the way plaintiffs frame these claims varies. Often, they are
framed by reference to traditional medical malpractice doctrine,
arguing that the ethical standards of the medical profession
establish duties and set standards of care that, if breached, can
subject a defendant to tort liability. 148 In other cases, plaintiffs

argue that a provider's breach of a specific ethical mandate is
grounds for a more focused type of claim-for example, based on
contract, fiduciary duty, or confidentiality. 14 9 In nearly all such

cases-in contexts as varied as sexual assault, consensual sexual
relations, confidentiality, informed consent, and nondisclosure of
test results-courts reject the argument that professional ethical

commitments establish prima facie legal duties. 150 Below are
several examples.
In a Texas case, a series of state courts denied recovery to a
plaintiff who alleged that she was sexually assaulted by her

psychiatrist. 151 Rather than bringing a traditional negligence,
malpractice, or battery claim, the patient sued her psychiatrist on
the grounds that he had breached an "implied warranty of
compliance of ethical commandments of the psychiatric calling." 152
At trial, the jury concluded that the psychiatrist had breached an

"implied[] warrant[y] [that] he would fully comply with the ethical
commandments of his calling" and that this breach caused the
patient's injury. 153 However, the trial court dismissed these jury
findings as immaterial. 154 The appeals court affirmed, holding that
147.
See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 152.
148.
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 161, 168. But see infra note 150 and
accompanying text.
149.
See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
150.
Note, however, that the cases cited below are ones where the plaintiff has
explicitly pled an ethical violation as the basis for legal recovery. There are, of course, other
cases involving similar conduct (for example, sexual conduct by physicians) where courts
have been willing to grant recovery, but the plaintiff has not specifically argued that
recovery should be premised on breach of an ethical duty. See ELIZABETH F. KUNIIOLM
KIM CHURcH, 4 LITIGATING TORT CASES § 54:41 (2021) (citing cases where plaintiffs have
recovered against sexually abusive physicians on theories including breach of fiduciary
duty).
151.
Dennis v. Allison, 678 S.W.2d 511, 514-15 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ
granted) aff'd, 698 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1985).
Dennis, 678 S.W.2d at 512.
152.
Id. at 512-13.
153.
154.
Id. at 513.
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although a psychiatric practitioner "impliedly contracts that he
possesses the reasonable degree of skill and learning possessed by
others of his profession, and that he will use reasonable and
ordinary care and skill in the application of such knowledge to

accomplish the purpose for which he is employed," there is no legal
precedent "recognizing a cause of action for breach of an implied
warranty of ethical commandments." 155 The Supreme Court of
Texas subsequently affirmed this decision, noting that there were
no public policy justifications for accepting an implied warranty
theory in such a case. 156 The court noted that the plaintiff could
potentially recover under medical malpractice or battery, 157 but
because the plaintiff had not brought such claims, she was denied
a remedy.158
In a similar Illinois case, a patient alleged that she was
sexually assaulted by a physician at a federal health facility
during a gynecological exam. 159 She brought suit in state court
against the physician and the facilities within which he was
practicing. 160 In her negligence action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), she argued that the defendants, the United
States and Resurrection Health Care Corporation, had breached a
duty to comply with the AMA's Code of Medical Ethics (the AMA
155.
Id.
156.
Dennis, 698 S.W.2d at 96 ("It is not necessary to impose an implied warranty
theory as a matter of public policy because the plaintiff patient has adequate remedies to
redress wrongs committed during treatment."). The plaintiff in this case had also brought
a claim for assault but, for reasons unknown, only submitted the implied warranty claim
to the jury. Id. at 94.
157.
Id. at 95-96. ("Although the question has not been addressed in Texas, other
states recognize that a cause of action for medical malpractice or assault and battery are

appropriate remedies for a plaintiff patient who has been sexually assaulted or beaten by
a physician or psychiatrist.").
158.
This case is one of several highlighted throughout this Article where courts have
rejected supposedly "novel" causes of action on the grounds that the plaintiff neglected to
pursue more traditional causes of action that would potentially be applicable to their
circumstances. Id.; see, e.g., Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846, 848 (S.C. 1996)
(rejecting a cause of action for breach of physician-patient confidentiality on the grounds
that it is "unnecessary to find a duty of confidentiality when there presently exist other
causes of action that address the harm," such as defamation and professional negligence);
Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 503 (Ill. 2000) ("We need not recognize a new cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty when a traditional medical negligence claim sufficiently
addresses the same alleged misconduct."). That said, were the plaintiffs to bring more
traditional claims, it is even less likely that courts would consider arguments grounded in
professional ethics, rather than traditional common law doctrine.
159.
Hasbun v. United States, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1011, 1013-14 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
Id. at 1013. Because the physician was considered an employee of the United
160.
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, her case was removed to federal court, and the

United States was substituted as a party to the suit instead of the physician. The United
States was also substituted as a party in lieu of one of the institutional defendants, PCC
Community Wellness Center. Id.
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Code). 161 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, applying Illinois tort law, dismissed the claim. It
concluded that the there was no legal authority establishing a duty
to comply with the AMA Code and no legal reasoning or caselaw

establishing that a hospital's "duty to its patients can be derived
from the AMA's medical ethics opinions." 16 2 As the federal court
was applying Illinois law, it relied on a state appellate opinion

holding that "a violation of the AMA's medical ethics does not in
itself amount to a breach of the legal standard of care."16 3 The
plaintiff's other claims-for medical malpractice and negligent
supervision-were also dismissed,1 64 leaving her with no remedy

for the sexual assault.1 65
Courts in contexts outside of physician sexual assault have
likewise rejected the ideas that providers have a duty to comply
with the standards of medical ethics and that ethical violations
alone might subject providers to tort liability.1 66

In a South Carolina case, a plaintiff sued a pharmacist for
falsely telling third parties that the plaintiff was being treated for
a sexually transmitted disease.1 67 Although there was no common
law duty of confidentiality on the part of pharmacists in the state,

the plaintiff argued that such a duty was established by the state's
licensing statute and by the Code of Ethics of the American
Pharmaceutical Association (the APA Code). 168 The Supreme
Court of South Carolina concluded that while the APA Code "may
161.
Specifically, Opinion 8.21, recommending institutional protocols for the use of
chaperones during physical examinations. Id. at 1015-17.
162.
Id. at 1017.
163.
Id. (quoting Neade v. Portes, 710 N.E.2d 418, 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)). In that
case, the court had rejected the notion that ethical standards might be dispositive as to duty
or standard of care but acknowledged that they would be "relevant to determining whether
a physician has breached his standard of care and certainly can form the basis of an expert's
opinion that a physician has breached the standard of care." Id.
164.
The negligent supervision claim had originally been dismissed without prejudice
with leave to amend, but the claim was not included in an Amended Complaint. Id. at 101516. The malpractice claim was dismissed on the grounds that it was "not based on Dr. Tong's
breach of the standard of care in providing medical treatment, but instead, [was] based on
Dr. Tong's alleged offensive sexual assault and battery." Id. at 1016.
165.
Id. at 1017. One could argue, of course, that this is a failure of the FTCA, rather
than of the tort system at large. Were it not for the FTCA, the plaintiff could have pursued
an individual cause of action against the physician himself. Regardless of the reason,
however, this case demonstrates a gap in tort law's ability to grant recovery for undisputed
harms (even when complemented by statutory law).
166.
Several courts note, however, that although ethical standards do not establish a
duty or dispositively set a standard of care, they can help illuminate the standard of care
where the law already recognizes the existence of a duty. See infra Section III.B.2.
167.
Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846, 847 (S.C. 1996).
168.
Id. at 847-48.
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be a potential source of guidance on a pharmacist's duty of care
generally, ... it does not create for pharmacists a statutory [or
common law] duty of confidentiality." 169
In an Arizona action for professional negligence, a patient
sued a radiologist who failed to report x-ray abnormalities directly
to the patient. 170 The appellate court relied on an AMA Ethical
Opinion (among other sources) to conclude that the radiologist had

a duty to report, 17 1 but the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the
appellate court's conclusion. 172 It "decline[d] to find a duty to
report . . . based upon the medical profession's ethical standards"
on the grounds that doing so would "conflate[] the existence of a
duty with the standard of care." 173 According to the court, the
radiologist in this case had a duty to act as a reasonably prudent
health care provider, but the exact contours of that duty depended
on contextual factors and could not be established by rules of

ethical conduct. 174

In an unreported Missouri case, the estate of a patient sued
her physician's wife (also a physician) for negligence, claiming that
the wife's failure to report her husband's brain damage and lack of
professional competence caused the patient's death. 175 The

plaintiff cited Principle II of the AMA's Principles of Medical
Ethics to argue that the defendant "was under a duty as a
physician to report his impairment to the Missouri Board of

Id. at 848. The court noted that it was unnecessary to establish a common law
169.
duty of confidentiality, because the plaintiffs harms could be addressed by other causes of
action, like defamation or professional negligence (on the grounds that "maintaining
customer information confidential may well be part of the general standard of care of the
professional pharmacist," albeit not an independent duty). Id.
170.
Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849, 850-51 (Ariz. 2004), aff'g in part, vacating in
part 63 P.3d 1076 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). The issues on appeal in this case were whether a
duty of care existed despite a lack of a traditional doctor-patient relationship and if such a
duty existed, what the standard of care was. The plaintiff relied on the AMA Ethical
Opinion in arguing that the radiologist, despite having no direct contact with the patient,
owed him a duty of care. Id. at 851, 854.
Id. at 854.
171.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Id. at 854-55. In a footnote, the court noted that while "rules of professional
conduct may provide evidence of how a professional would act, they do not create a duty or
establish a standard of care as a matter of law. . . . We continue to believe, however, that
while such rules may illuminate the standard of care, they do not serve as a basis on which
to impose a duty." Id. at 854 n.6.
Phelps v. deMello, No. 4:07CV366, 2007 WL 1063567, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9,
175.
2007).
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Healing Arts and to his employer." 176 However, the court
dismissed the patient's claim, holding that the physician's wife

had no professional duty to report her husband's condition and
rejecting the argument that this ethical principle established a
legally binding duty of care. 177
Numerous other state courts have likewise opined that the
ethical standards of the medical profession are not binding, do not
establish legal duties, and cannot form an independent basis for
tort liability.178 Only when there is already legal precedent to
support a plaintiff's claims will courts cite ethics opinions and
guidelines as providing additional support for those claims. 179 This
Article has identified only one case holding that expert testimony
regarding professional ethics can be the basis for a cause of action

176.
Principle II states that "[a] physician shall uphold the standards of
professionalism .. . and strive to report physicians deficient .. . in competence. . . ." Id. at
*3.
177. Id.
178.
See, e.g., Smith v. Radecki, 238 P.3d 111, 115-16 (Alaska 2010) (assessing
whether a malpractice claim could be brought against an independent medical examiner
(IME) in the absence of a traditional physician-patient relationship, rejecting plaintiff's
argument that AMA ethical guidelines impose duties of care on IMEs, describing AMA
guidelines as "a non-binding code for ethical behavior by member physicians," and finding
no authority to support the argument "that these guidelines bear on the scope of IME
physicians' legal liability"); Korper v. Weinstein, 783 N.E.2d 877, 881-82 (Mass. App. Ct.
2003) (dismissing patient's claims for damages against a physician with whom she had a
consensual sexual relationship, holding that "violations of medical ethics do not, however,
without more, establish legal liability for damages" on fiduciary duty grounds, and
concluding that violation of "a professional ethical rule" set by a licensing statute is not a
basis for liability); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P.2d 110, 113-14 (Okla. 1988) (dismissing
patient's claim that physician who disclosed information about him to the police breached
a duty of confidentiality established by the Hippocratic Oath and the Principles of Medical
Ethics, noting that "ethical standards are aspirational in nature and not enforceable by
law," and reasoning that even if that was not the case there was no evidence of breach);
Hartsell ex rel. Upton v. Fort Sanders Reg'l Med. Ctr., 905 S.W.2d 944, 950 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995) (affirming trial court's exclusion of evidence regarding the AMA's ethical standards
as harmless error, noting that "ethical opinions are not the standard of care in Tennessee").
179.
See, e.g., Reed v. Bojarski, 764 A.2d 433, 443-45 (N.J. 2001) (holding that a
physician retained to perform a pre-employment physical owes a duty of reasonable care to
his patients and that the finding of such a duty is supported by common law principles,
medical board regulations, and professional ethics opinions); Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602
N.E.2d 98, 103-04 (Ind. 1992) (relying on caselaw to conclude that the "reasonably prudent
physician" standard applies to informed consent cases, and citing AMA ethics opinions in
support of this conclusion); see also Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793,
796-98 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (holding that even in the absence of binding precedent, public
policy supports a finding that an insurer who induces a doctor to divulge confidential
information about a patient may be liable in damages, and citing medical codes of ethics, a
privileged communications statute, and a medical licensing statute as supporting that
policy perspective); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483, 497, 515 (Cal.
1990) (finding common law support for plaintiff's fiduciary duty and informed consent
claims without reference to principles of medical ethics, despite a concurrence and dissent
citing such principles).
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not otherwise established by common law; however, that decision
was later overruled. 180

These holdings-that professional ethical standards are not,
on their own, a basis for liability-are consistent with
well-established precedent relating to tort claims for legal
malpractice. When clients bring malpractice suits against their
attorneys on the basis of a violation of the rules of professional
responsibility, courts consistently conclude that such violations on
their own are not a basis for civil liability or a tort remedy.181
Indeed, some of the medical malpractice cases cited above have
relied on precedent from legal malpractice cases in rejecting any
legal conclusions based on professional ethics opinions. 182
2. Ethical Standards as Potentially Relevant to the
Standard of Care. While principles of medical ethics do not
establish legally binding duties that trigger tort liability, they may
be one piece of relevant evidence relied upon by experts testifying
as to the standard of care in malpractice cases. This, again, is
consistent with longstanding jurisprudence in legal malpractice
cases, which hold that professional ethics standards may be
relevant evidence but are not dispositive as to the standard of
care. 183 This is also consistent with the trend in the confidentiality
180.
Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 378-79 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
because the medical standard of care is determined by the medical profession, an expert's
conclusion that informed consent is required by professional ethics opinions can ground a
cause of action for informed consent), overruled by Blotner v. Doreika, 678 S.E.2d 80 (Ga.
2009).
181.
That said, some courts recognize that they may be relevant evidence in a
professional negligence action. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

52 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2000) ("[P]roof of violation of a professional rule does not by itself
give rise to a cause of action or, by itself, make out a violation of the applicable duty of
care."); see also John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48
RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 116-17 (1995); The Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes in Legal
Malpractice:Erasinga Double Standard, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1108 (1996) [hereinafter
The Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes]; Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of Professional
Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. REV. 281,
285 (1979); Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400, 404-05,
407 (Tenn. 1991) (holding that the Code of Professional Responsibility "does not set the
standard of care upon which an action for negligence can be based," and citing Alabama,
Georgia, and Texas caselaw to explain that allegations that an attorney violated ethical
guidelines do not form a basis for liability or set a standard of care but merely provide
guidance or inspiration as to an attorney's ethical obligations).
182.
See, e.g., Bala v. Powers Ferry Psych. Assocs., 491 S.E.2d 380, 381 (Ga. Ct. App.
1997) (citing Davis v. Findley, 422 S.E.2d 859 (Ga. 1992)).
183.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 52

cmt. f (AM. L. INST.

2000) (citing cases); Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc., 813 S.W.2d at 404-05 (noting that the
Code of Professional Conduct for lawyers does not form a basis for civil liability but serves
only as a relevant guide in forming the standard of care); E. River Sav. Bank v. Steele, 311

&
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cases cited in section III.A.3, where courts conclude that public
policy considerations-including the existence of professional
ethical commitments-may support the imposition of liability. 184
In a substantial number of cases where plaintiffs introduce
evidence about the ethical standards of the profession when
arguing about the standard of care or breach of duty, courts
recognize that these standards may have some legal relevance. 185

However, courts fall short of concluding that ethical standards
establish a duty or define the standard of care, or that breach of
an ethical standard is dispositive as to breach of duty. While the

factual circumstances of these cases vary, courts across the
country use similar language to convey this idea. The Arizona

Supreme Court, for example, concluded that rules of medical
ethics "may illuminate the standard of care" but do not establish a
duty of care. 186 The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that a

professional association's code of ethics "may be a potential source
of guidance on . .. duty of care generally" but "does not
create . . . [a] duty." 187 A Georgia court of appeals has concluded

that although an "alleged violation of a professional ethical
standard, 'standing alone, cannot serve as a legal basis for a
[professional] malpractice action,"'188 it may constitute relevant
evidence as to the standard of care in a malpractice case. 189
Although many courts support the general principle that

ethics standards may be one piece of relevant evidence in
S.E.2d 189, 191-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (reversing a denial for summary judgment where a
plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress hinged on the Code of
Professional Responsibility).
184.
See supra Section ILI.A.2.
185.
See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
186.
Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849, 854 n.6 (Ariz. 2004), aff'g in part, vacating in
part 63 P.3d 1076 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
187.
Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846, 848 (S.C. 1996). The court noted that it
was unnecessary to find such a duty, because the plaintiffs harms could be addressed by
other causes of action, like defamation or professional negligence (on the basis that the
general standard of care for pharmacists may include a duty to keep customer information

confidential). Id.
188.
Bala v. Powers Ferry Psych. Assocs., 491 S.E.2d 380, 381 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(citing Davis v. Findley, 422 S.E.2d 859 (Ga. 1992)); Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes
Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d 719, 720 (Ga. 1995).
189.
Bala, 491 S.E.2d at 381 ("Given a liberal reading, as required, we conclude that
[the expert's] statement could be construed as expressing an opinion that Friedman's
disclosure of confidential information concerning Bala violated the standard of care
governing all psychologists as memorialized by that profession's ethical code of conduct.
This is especially true in light of the fact that the Supreme Court of this state has recognized
that professional ethical standards constitute evidence of a common law duty of care so long
as they are intended to protect a person in the position of the alleged injured party or are
specifically addressed to the particular harm suffered by that party, as is the case here.").
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determining whether a defendant breached the standard of care,
there are fewer cases where courts have actually applied this
principle to give serious consideration to ethics in a malpractice
case. 190 In North Carolina, appellate courts have twice upheld

lower court decisions to accept expert testimony about ethical
standards in malpractice cases against mental health
practitioners. 191 In one of these cases, the court explained that
although "breaches of professional ethics are not actionable in a
malpractice suit when such standards differ from the reasonable
standard of care imposed by tort law," it is not error to permit
expert witnesses to present their opinions regarding professional
ethics if they testify that "the accepted standards of care are
coterminous with the relevant standards of professional ethics." 192
The only context in which a substantial number of courts have
awarded tort recovery based in part on the breach of an ethical
standard is in the confidentiality cases cited in section III.A.3. In
several jurisdictions, court decisions about whether to allow
recovery for breach of doctor-patient confidentiality have been
based primarily on policy considerations, rather than on existing
precedent. 193 Among those policy considerations is the fact that
(including
standards
by ethical
are bound
physicians
confidentiality) and that widespread public awareness of such
standards supports recognizing a cause of action, whether
grounded in theories of tort or implied contract. 194 Several courts
have explicitly cited the Hippocratic Oath and the AMA's
Principles of Medical Ethics as grounds for the ethical principle of
physician-patient confidentiality and cited them approvingly in
discussions of policy justifications for recognizing a cause of
action. 195

190.
Outside the tort context, in a criminal case where a jury found that a physician's
actions were outside the scope of appropriate medical practice and that he had criminal
intent, the court relied on evidence regarding (among other things) professional ethics
standards to conclude that the jury's decision was not supported by the evidence. State v.
Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 213-15, 223 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
191.
Mazza v. Huffaker, 300 S.E.2d 833, 842 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming judgment
against defendant psychiatrist who was found to have had a sexual relationship with his
patient's wife); MacClements v. Lafone, 408 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(affirming judgment against defendant therapist who was found to have had a sexual
relationship with his patient).
Mazza, 300 S.E.2d at 842.
192.
See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 590 (D.C. 1985) (citing
193.
authorities where public policy has been a primary reason for courts' acceptance of a claim
for breach of confidentiality).
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
194.
195.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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3. Ethical Standards as Irrelevant to the Standard of Care.
However, not all courts accept principles of medical ethics as being
relevant, even tangentially, to the professional standard of care. A

few courts have rejected plaintiffs' introduction of evidence
regarding medical ethics in malpractice cases, concluding that
such evidence is irrelevant in determining the standard of care or
assessing whether that standard of care was breached.
Perhaps the most well-known case is Neade v. Portes, in which

the estate of a patient who died of a heart attack brought claims
for medical negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against the
patient's physician. 196 According to the plaintiff, the physician did
not recommend or authorize an angiogram that could have

detected coronary artery disease, despite the fact that another
physician had made that recommendation. 197 The plaintiff
brought a malpractice claim for failure to order the angiogram and
argued that the reason the defendant physician failed to authorize
the angiogram was because he was incentivized by the health
maintenance organization (HMO) to limit outside diagnostic

testing.1 98 The plaintiff also brought a breach of fiduciary duty
claim for failure to disclose the HMO's financial incentives, on the
grounds that such disclosure was required as a matter of
professional ethics.1 99
With respect to the medical malpractice claim, both the trial
and the appellate courts held that the physician's financial
motivations were not relevant to the question of whether or not he

breached the professional standard of care. 200 Despite expert
testimony that denying care based on financial incentives violated

196.
Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 498-99 (Ill. 2000).
197.
Id. at 499.
198.
Id. at 499, 502 ("Pursuantto the contract between Dr. Portes, Primary Care and
Chicago HMO, any portion of the Medical Incentive Fund that was not used for referrals or
outside tests would be divided at the end of each year between Primary Care's full time
physicians and Chicago HMO, with the physicians receiving 60% of the remaining money
and Chicago HMO receiving 40%. If the Medical Incentive Fund was exhausted prior to the
end of the year, Dr. Portes and his group would be required to fund any additional
consultant fees and outside tests.").
199.
The fiduciary duty claim alleged that the defendant physician "had a fiduciary
duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of Mr. Neade, and that he breached that
duty by refusing to authorize further testing, by refusing to refer Mr. Neade to a specialist
and by refusing to disclose to the Neades Dr. Portes' financial relationship" with the HMO,
as well as by "entering into a contract with Chicago HMO that put his financial well-being
in direct conflict with Mr. Neade's physical well-being." Id. at 499. In support of this claim,
the plaintiff cited AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs Opinion 8.132, "Referral of
Patients: Disclosure of Limitations." Id. at 504.
200.
Id. at 499-500.

ETHICAL MALPRACTICE

2022]

ethical norms,

201

1111

both courts struck the allegations regarding

financial incentives. 202 The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld this
decision but agreed with the appellate court that if the defendant
were to testify at trial, such evidence could be introduced (at the
discretion of the court) as relevant to the defendant's credibility. 203
With respect to the fiduciary duty claim, the plaintiff
introduced expert testimony that "both the applicable standard of

care and ethical considerations obligate a doctor to disclose his
financial interest in withholding care" so that the patient can
make an informed decision. 204 In particular, the plaintiff cited an
ethics opinion by the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs. 205 However, both the trial court 206 and the Supreme Court
of Illinois dismissed the fiduciary duty claim. 207 The courts held
that the fiduciary duty claim was duplicative of the medical
malpractice claim, 208 because the operative facts of both causes of
action were identical, with only one exception-the fiduciary duty
claim introduced evidence about the HMO incentive fund. 209
Because of the similarities between the allegations in both counts,
the court held that it was unnecessary to "recognize a new cause
of action for breach of fiduciary duty when a traditional medical
negligence claim sufficiently addresses the same alleged
misconduct." 210
201.
Id. at 499.
202. 'Id. at 499-500.
203.
Id. at 506.
204.
Id. at 499-500.
AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Opinion 8.132 states that:
205.
Physicians must assure disclosure of any financial inducements that may tend to
limit the diagnostic and therapeutic alternatives that are offered to patients or
that may tend to limit patients' overall access to care. Physicians may satisfy this
obligation by assuring that the managed care plan makes adequate disclosure to
patients enrolled in the plan.
Id. at 504.
206.
Id. at 499.
207.
Id. at 505-06.
208.
Id. at 505. The Supreme Court of Illinois noted that while "Illinois courts have
never addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff can state a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty against a physician," they have explicitly rejected fiduciary duty claims
against attorneys where the "operative facts" are duplicative of a malpractice claim. Id. at
500.
209.
Id. at 502-03.
Id. at 503. Several commentators, including myself, have challenged the idea that
210.
fiduciary duty claims (including those grounded in ethical breaches) are duplicative of
malpractice claims. Professor Mehlman explicitly takes this perspective, noting that a
fiduciary duty claim "deals with whether or not the physician acted loyally, while
[malpractice] deals with whether the physician acted with due care." Mehlman, supra note
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In an Oregon case of medical malpractice for injuries resulting

from negligence during surgery, the Supreme Court of Oregon
similarly concluded that the physician's motivations-even if
unethical-were irrelevant to the question of whether he breached
the standard of care. 211 The plaintiff had moved to amend the
malpractice complaint to include a claim of negligence based on
the fact that her doctor continued treating her even after they

began having a sexual relationship. 2 12 The lower courts denied the
plaintiff's motion to amend and granted the defendant's motion to

exclude any evidence about the sexual relationship between the
parties. 213 The plaintiff had argued that evidence of the sexual
relationship was relevant to her medical malpractice claim
because the relationship may have "clouded" his judgment and led
to a violation of his ethical duty to make treatment decisions in an

objective manner. 214 The Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this
argument, holding that the physician's underlying state of mind is

irrelevant in assessing whether he complied with the objective
standard of care for medical treatment. 215 In other words, if a
physician's "actual treatment of a patient reflects the appropriate

degree of care," they cannot be found liable for negligence even if
they have violated their ethical duty to maintain an objective state
of mind. 2 16

124, at 27. There are other differences as well, Mehlman notes-the burden of proof in
fiduciary duty conflict of interest claims is shifted to the defendant to prove they acted
loyally, and the remedies are different (compensation for malpractice; constructive trust,
specific performance, and punitive damages for fiduciary duty). Id. at 28-29. It is entirely
possible, according to Mehlman, for a physician to breach a fiduciary duty "even if the care
that they provided meets the standard of care for negligence." Id. at 30 ("For example, the
physician may have made a mistake that was reasonable but that could have been avoided
had the physician not acted out of self-interest. Alternatively, the physician may have
deprived the patient of care that, while reasonable, would have been of even higher quality
had the physician not acted self-interestedly.").
211.
Macy v. Blatchford, 8 P.3d 204, 206-08 (Or. 2000). The defendant gynecologist
treated the plaintiff for pelvic pain and performed several surgeries. The plaintiff argued
that the defendant negligently stapled her ureter, did not identify that the stapled ureter
was the cause of her pain, negligently recommended earlier surgeries, and failed to obtain
informed consent for that surgery. She later moved to amend her complaint to add a claim
that "defendant had been negligent in continuing his physician-patient relationship with
Macy after entering into a personal, sexual relationship with her." Id.
212.
Id. at 207.
213.
Id.
214.
Id. at 208.
215.
The subjective state of mind of the defendant (however unethical or wrong) bears
no relation to the objective standard of care on the physician. If despite the clouded
judgment, the physician acted according to the standard of care, then there is no liability.
Id. at 209.
216.
Id. at 208.
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A pre-EMTALA Arizona case involving a physician's duty to
provide emergency treatment likewise rejected ethical standards
2 17
as irrelevant to a common law cause of action for malpractice.
In a claim alleging that the defendant physician unlawfully
refused to treat a patient with acute hyperglycemia, the court
noted that the hospital's medical staff bylaws expressly
incorporated the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics. 218 While the
court ultimately concluded that the physician was "obligated by
contract" to treat the patient, it emphasized that its "holding, as
such, is not in any sense based upon Section 5 of the Code of
Ethics . . . [and] would be the same even without the incorporation
of the Code of Ethics into the bylaws." 219 In effect, the court applied
traditional contract principles to resolve the claim and expressly
disavowed the relevance of the profession's ethical principleseven though those principles were incorporated into the medical
staff bylaws that ostensibly were the basis of the contractual
relationship. 2 20
In all of these cases, when plaintiffs sought to introduce
evidence about professional ethics to support their claimswhether framed in terms of fiduciary duty, traditional negligence,
or medical malpractice-courts found that evidence inadmissible
(and in two cases, denied recovery). In other words, the courts held
that the providers' alleged breach of ethical duty was legally
without relevance in a suit for recovery under common law.
IV. WHAT MIGHT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ETHICAL MALPRACTICE
LOOK LIKE?
As demonstrated above, patients seeking tort compensation
for a physician's breach of ethical standards of care are limited in
their ability to recover. Courts uniformly deny the existence of an
independent duty to comply with the ethical standards of the
medical profession, and some even deny that these ethical

EMTALA was enacted in 1986. EMTALA Fact Sheet, AM. COLL. EMERGENCY
217.
PHYSICIANS, https://www.acep.org/life-as-a-physician/ethics--legal/emtala/emtala-fact-shee
t/ [https://perma.cc/XY6P-SHXL] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
Hiser v. Randolph, 617 P.2d 774, 776-77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980), disapproved of by
218.
Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984).
Id. at 778.
219.
220.
See also Hartsell ex rel. Upton v. Fort Sanders Reg'l Med. Ctr., 905 S.W.2d 944,
949-51 (Tenn. App. 1995) (affirming trial court's exclusion of evidence regarding AMA
rulings as harmless error despite the fact that the defendant-physician in that case had
"contractually agreed to abide by those rulings").
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standards might be relevant to a jury's determination of standard

of care and breach.
When courts decline to recognize duties of care grounded in
medical ethics, their reasoning is-like much of common lawself-referential. Courts hold that principles of medical ethics do not

establish duties or define standards of care because these
principles are not legally binding. In other words, medical ethics
have no legal force because they have no legal force. Ethics
opinions issued by professional medical associations have not been
passed by legislatures, adopted by administrative agencies, 221 or
embedded in the common law; therefore, there is no reason for
judges or juries to defer to them.
And yet, it is important to recognize that the development of
common law is an evolutionary process. The common law is not
static; it builds on a foundation of prior precedential and
persuasive judicial opinions. Moreover, common law also develops

based on policy considerations. Many of the foundational cases in
tort law are grounded not in precedent but in emerging judicial
views on novel issues of public policy. 2 2 2 The informed consent
cause of action, described in section III.A.2, is a classic example
where courts recognized a new legal duty for physicians even in
the absence of any relevant professional custom. Another example
is in the context of doctor-patient confidentiality, described in

section III.A.3, where some courts rely on public policy factorsincluding the ethical commitments of the medical profession-to
award recovery for a harm that had not been previously recognized
under common law.
This history might serve as a model for the development of a
cause of action for "ethical malpractice." Certainly, there is
stronger theoretical support for ethics-based malpractice claims

than there was for tort claims of informed consent. At least some
scholars argue that attorneys and judges created the duty of
informed consent out of whole cloth, without any meaningful

221.
That said, some state medical licensing statutes permit disciplinary action to be
taken on the grounds of a physician's violation of ethical standards promulgated by a
professional association. See, e.g., Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 614 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ohio
1993) (citing R.C. 4731.22(B)(14) and (15)).
222.
See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976)
("[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that,
in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.").
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support or reflection in actual medical practice. 223 Today, however,
there are many well-accepted ethical dictates in medicine that are
the duty of doctor-patient
part of medical custom 224 -like
confidentiality-giving even stronger support to the idea that

there are policy reasons for judges to acknowledge duties and
standards of care that had not previously been recognized in law.
Although principles of medical ethics may have no legal force
on their own, there is nothing to stop judges from integrating these
principles into the common law as a matter of policy. Given that
backdrop, it is difficult to understand why there is still so little
judicial recognition that physicians owe patients a duty to comply
not only with the technical standards of professional practice, but
also its ethical standards.
This part explores several paths that tort law might take in
addressing claims for compensation based on breaches of
professional ethics.
A.

The TraditionalMedical Malpractice Model

The approach that would be most in line with current practice
would recognize that ethical norms may inform the standard of
care expected of a reasonable physician or health care
professional. It would not establish as a matter of law that all
health care professionals have a duty to comply with ethical
norms. However, it would acknowledge that the scope of the
general duty to exercise reasonable care may, depending on the
factual circumstances, include duties to comply with specific

See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 96, at 2-3 (describing that judicial decision-making in
223.
the area of informed consent was not based on the medical profession's customary practice,
and was in fact a "radical break with medical practices ... [for] more than two thousand
years of recorded medical history").

224.
See David T. Stern & Maxine Papadakis, The DevelopingPhysician-Becoming a
Professional, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1794, 1795 (2006) (describing the development of ethics
education in medical schools since the 1970s); Tom Beauchamp & James Childress,
Principles of Biomedical Ethics: Marking Its FortiethAnniversary, 19 AM J. BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 9, 9, 11 (2019) (describing their foundational volume as establishing a "common set
of ethical principles for bioethical discourse and practice," and noting its significant impact
in the fields of both clinical and research ethics); Alexander Limentani, The Role of Ethical
Principles in Health Care and the Implications for Ethical Codes, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 394,
397 (1999) (describing ethical principles and codes as "represent[ing] concepts and values
that can set the general ethical character and approach for health care"); Sheheen E.
Lakhan et al., Time for a Unified Approach to Medical Ethics, PHIL. ETHICS & HUMANS.
MED., Sept. 2009, at 1, 4 (noting that "[w]ithin the field of ethics certain principles have
reached a consensus of importance," and recommending standardized incorporation of these
concepts into the medical curriculum in order to "provide a consistent framework of
knowledge for practitioners").
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ethical standards. 225 Consistent with traditional principles of tort
law, the extent to which these ethical standards inform the
professional standard of care in a given case would be determined
by the judge, and whether those standards were breached would
be determined by a jury. 2 26
Thus, a patient claiming injury as a result of an ethical

violation could bring a traditional malpractice claim. The prima
facie case would be satisfied if the patient proved that the
defendant owed them a duty to exercise reasonable care in
complying with the customary standard of care of their profession,
that such duty was breached, and that the breach was the factual
and proximate cause of the patient's injury.227 The details of the
standard of care and breach would, as usual, be established more
concretely through expert testimony. 228 Experts for both the
plaintiff and defendant could testify as to whether the standard of
care in similar circumstances includes compliance with any

specific ethical guidelines. If the jury concluded that the
defendant's conduct violated the standard of care of a reasonable
medical practitioner-taking into account customary standards of
ethical practice-and that this breach caused physical injury to
the patient, the patient could recover for medical malpractice.
The difficulty with this model, however, is that it would not

allow patients to recover for ethical violations that result in solely
dignitary harms-such as, for example, the very real dignitary
harms that result from discrimination in the context of medical

treatment. Medical malpractice has always been a tool for
compensating for physical injuries, rather than dignitary or
emotional harms, and it seems difficult to imagine that courts

would stray from this traditional model. 2 29

B. A Separate Cause of Action for Ethical Malpractice:The
Informed Consent Model
An alternative approach would recognize that, as a matter of
law, a health care professional's duty of care includes a duty to

comply with the profession's ethical norms. The scope of this duty
in any given circumstance would, as above, be determined through

expert testimony, but this approach would require a plaintiff to
225.
226.
227.

See supra Section III.B.2.
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 115,
Id. § 283.

228.

Id.

229.

See supra Part III.

§ 251.
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specifically plead a violation of the duty to comply with ethical
norms, rather than a violation of the general duty of care.
This approach would mirror the path that the tort of informed
consent has taken. Although the duty to secure a patient's

informed consent is within the physician's general duty of
reasonable care, it is unique enough that courts have determined

it to be a separate cause of action.

230

Under this approach,

deviation from the customary practices of reasonable physicians
with respect to technical skill, medical knowledge, or diagnostic
ability would fall within the scope of a medical malpractice claim.
Deviation from the customary practices of reasonable physicians
with respect to disclosure duties would fall within the scope of an
informed consent claim. And deviation from the customary
practices of reasonable physicians with respect to medical ethics
would fall within the scope of an "ethical malpractice" claim.
Much like informed consent claims, an ethical malpractice
claim could be brought either independently or as an additional
cause of action alongside a traditional medical malpractice claim.
The evidentiary approach would be the same as in the medical
malpractice model-the judge would determine the scope and
content of the physician's ethical duty and the jury would assess
breach and causation-but the existence of a general duty to
comply with professional ethics would be taken for granted as a
matter of law. 23 1
If tracking the informed consent model, a plaintiff bringing an
ethical malpractice claim would be required to prove that the
ethical breach resulted in a physical injury. As discussed above,
although the traditional informed consent cause of action has gone
on a separate path than traditional malpractice, it still requires
the patient to demonstrate that a physical injury occurred and
that that injury was both factually and legally caused by the
ethical breach. 232 If a cause of action for ethical malpractice were
to take this approach, it would truly be akin to the informed
consent model and would have the same limitations-namely, the
requirement of physical injury.
That said, it is possible that a new cause of action for ethical
malpractice could deviate further from the traditional malpractice
and informed consent models by redefining the nature of the
injury. Both malpractice claims and informed consent claims
230.

See supra Section III.A.2.

231.

DOBBS ET AL., supra note 115, §251.

232.

Sheley, supranote 72.
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require plaintiffs to prove physical injury, but one might consider
a regime where violation of patient-protective ethical norms would

be viewed as a compensable dignitary harm even in the absence of
physical injury.

233

Indeed, many contemporary scholars have

challenged the traditional approach, arguing that informed
consent violations should be actionable for dignitary harms
alone. 234

Just as claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress
(NIED) and breach of confidentiality do not always require proof
of physical harm, 235 ethical malpractice could likewise be viewed
as a dignitary tort. Proof of breach of ethical duty alone would be
the basis of an independent cause of action, with the presumption
that the breach caused harm to the patient and that such harmeven if intangible-is compensable.

In light of tort law's historical resistance to recognizing purely
dignitary torts, however, judicial acceptance of such a model seems
somewhat unlikely. The limited contexts in which tort law has
recognized dignitary harms as a compensable injury are few and
far between, and the fact that courts in informed consent cases
have insisted on retaining the physical injury requirement
suggests that they would be reluctant to abandon it in another
malpractice-adjacent action. 236

That said, the more examples we see of ethical breaches that
result in purely dignitary harms (or that result in limited physical
harm), the greater the policy justifications for expanding law's

recognition of compensable injuries. Consider, for example, some
of the examples introduced in the Introduction-such as
discrimination against patients based on personal characteristics;
nonconsensual pelvic examination of unconscious women;
violation of sexual boundaries; breaches of confidentiality; and
reproductive harms. 237 A cause of action for ethical malpractice
233.
Id. at 63.
234.
See, e.g., Alan Meisel, A "DignitaryTort" as a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed
Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 210, 216 (1988);
Alan J. Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law's Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory,
65 NEB. L. REV. 749, 763 (1986).
235.
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 115, § 390; Colleen K. Sanson, Health Care Provider's
Wrongful Disclosure of Confidential Medical Information, 116 AM. JUR. PROOF FACTS 3d 1
§ 18.
236.
See supra note 72.
237.
Dov Fox, for example, criticizes modern tort law for failing to compensate even
egregious conduct that violates reproductive autonomy because "existing causes of action
lack the narratives required" for plaintiffs to be heard in court. Dov Fox, Reproductive
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that recognized dignitary harms as legally compensable would
provide a remedy for all these injuries, even those that don't fit
within the boundaries of traditional causes of action.
C. Recognizing Ethical Malpractice Without Doctrinal
Consistency: The ConfidentialityModel
As noted in section III.A.3, courts have taken a variety of
approaches when patients bring suit for breach of doctor-patient
confidentiality. Only some jurisdictions recognize this as a tort in
its own right. However, even those jurisdictions that decline to
recognize an independent cause of action for breach of
confidentiality find creative ways to allow patients to recoverwhether under contract law, fiduciary duty doctrine, or some other
legal remedy. When the injury a patient suffers results from an
ethical violation, such an approach may be more palatable to
courts than developing an independent cause of action or
integrating ethical principles into the standard of care in
traditional malpractice cases. The flaw with such an approach,
however, is its lack of doctrinal consistency. One would imagine
that an ethical duty as well established as the duty of physicians
to maintain their patients' confidentiality would have an
analogous duty in the legal world that is recognized uniformly
across jurisdictions. And yet, that is not the case. If part of the goal
of recognizing ethical breaches as legal violations is to emphasize
the centrality of professional ethics to physicians' legal duties to
patients, then a doctrinally scattered approach would not achieve
this goal as effectively as the approaches set out in sections IV.A

or IV.B.
V. CHALLENGES TO ETHICAL MALPRACTICE AS AN INDEPENDENT
TORT
Although, as noted above, there are various avenues by which
tort law might seek to respond to plaintiffs' claims of ethical
breaches by health care professionals, courts have been willing to
Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 155, 157 (2017); see also Eibshutz, supra note 57, at
920 (arguing that that the crime of physicians deceiving patients by using their own sperm
during artificial insemination "arises from the lack of proper characterization of the doctor's
behavior. Prosecutors don't know what to qualify this crime as-is it assault, fraud, battery,
a civil tort, a breach of contract? The list of possibilities is seemingly endless and yet the
crime may not perfectly fit the elements of any of those offenses."). The common law
requirement of bodily harm in such cases can be extrapolated broadly to cover harms caused
by unethical conduct that similarly do not result in physical injury and could be overcome
by a cause of action for ethical malpractice which recognizes a broader set of harms.
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do so only rarely. The explanation courts offer for their refusal is
that in tort litigation, principles of medical ethics have no legal
force. But as noted in Part IV above, the historical development of
tort law has successfully integrated ethical concepts like the duty
to secure informed consent and the duty to maintain
confidentiality; thus, tort law's role in advancing public policy
might support recognition of ethical duties as legal duties. This
part examines the most likely criticisms and challenges to legal

recognition of professional ethical obligations as a basis for tort
recovery and assesses their merits.

A. Different Purposes:Duties to the Profession, Duties to the
Public
Drawing on caselaw and literature from legal malpractice is

particularly instructive in considering the merits of tort liability
for ethical violations. In the context of legal malpractice, courts are
reluctant to impose tort liability on the basis of a breach of the

American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. According to one author, some courts "either refuse
to allow any explicit mention of the codes to establish the standard
of care or else burden their use with weighty restrictions such that
their evidentiary value is largely nullified." 238 As a preliminary

matter, the introductory scope section of the Model Rules states:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action
nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has
been breached. The Rules are designed to provide guidance
to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a
basis for civil liability. . . . Accordingly, nothing in the Rules
should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of
lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating
such a duty.239

238.
The Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes, supranote 181, at 1104. But see Marc R.
Greenough, The Inadmissibility of Professional Ethical Standards in Legal Malpractice
Actions After Hizey v. Carpenter, 68 WASH. L. REV. 395, 398-99 (1993) ("Courts take four
different approaches to admitting professional ethical standards as evidence of an
attorney's duty of care in legal malpractice actions. First, some courts hold that professional
ethical standards conclusively establish the duty of care and that any violation constitutes
negligence per se. Second, a minority of courts finds that a professional ethical violation
establishes a rebuttable presumption of legal malpractice. Third, a large majority of courts
treats professional ethical standards as evidence of the common law duty of care. Finally,
one court has found professional ethical standards inadmissible as evidence of an attorney's
duty of care.").
239.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
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Similarly, most state rules of professional responsibility
include disclaimers as to their use in civil litigation, and courts
0
have relied on these statements to oppose their use. 2 4 Courts have
interpreted statements like these as meaning that the rules are
aimed at establishing obligations to the profession, the legal
system, and to the public at large rather than to individual
client-plaintiffs, and therefore cannot form the basis of
malpractice liability. 241 Similar concerns might be raised in the
context of medical malpractice and violations of professional
standards of medical ethics.
Although these arguments are well accepted in the context of
legal malpractice, they are not immune from challenge. 242 Even if
we describe professional codes as establishing duties to the
profession rather than duties to individual patients or clients, it is
important to consider the underlying value of the obligation to the
profession. The purpose of professional self-regulation is to protect
the public; this much is clear from state medical licensing
statutes. 243 Of course, the profession may have more specific rules
than general tort law, but if the goal of those rules is to serve and
protect the public, it seems surprising that the tort system does
not recognize them as well.
Relatedly, there is significant overlap between the goals of the
tort system and the goals of professional self-regulation. Tort law

aims at compensating victims for their losses, shifting costs from
those least able to bear financial burdens to those with greater
resources, and incentivizing actors to live up to the standard of

Ann Peters, The Model Rules as a Guide for Legal Malpractice, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL
240.
ETHICS 609, 611, 613-15, 617 (1993) (citing the Model Rules of ProfessionalResponsibility,
noting that the legislative history of the Model Rules "reflects the opposition to the use of
attorney ethics codes as the basis for civil liability" and that most jurisdictions that have
adopted the Model Rules have retained this disclaimer).
See, e.g., Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 650-51, 653 (Wash. 1992) (describing
241.
caselaw concluding that "breach of an ethics rule provides only a public, e.g., disciplinary,
remedy and not a private remedy," and reaching the same conclusion); Allen v. Lefkoff,
Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d 719, 720 (Ga. 1995) (holding that the Code of
Professional Responsibility "cannot provide the sole basis for the standard of care applied
in a legal malpractice action" because it only provides sanctions for professional
misconduct).

See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 181, at 283 (identifying specific provisions of the
242.
Code that "may be of potential utility in private party litigation"); Peters, supra note 240,
at 610 (arguing for greater reliance on the Model Rules and state ethics rules in legal
malpractice actions as a way to "improve the profession's credibility in the public eye"); The
Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes, supra note 181, at 119 (challenging courts' reluctance
to use professional codes in malpractice actions and arguing for their expanded use).
Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical
243.
Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 285, 290, 295 (2010).
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care. 244 Professional
self-regulation
incentivizes
through
professional discipline. These are merely two different ways of
promoting positive behavior and deterring detrimental behavior.

Of course, it is possible that the behavior the profession wishes to
incentivize/deter is different in kind than the behavior courts wish

to incentivize/deter. But to the extent that the common law of
professional malpractice is grounded in professional custom,245 it

makes sense that the standards a profession sets for itself should
be relevant to the standards others should expect of it.
Indeed, in both legal and medical malpractice, courts have
acknowledged this. While denying that rules of professional

responsibility establish legally enforceable duties, some courts
recognize that they may be relevant evidence when assessing
whether someone has breached the standard of care. 24 6
B. Different Purposes: Setting Minimal Standards Versus
AspirationalStandards
In addition to the arguments from legal malpractice and the
rules of professional responsibility, arguments about the differing

purposes of tort law can also be seen in the medical world, albeit
in the context of practice and not ethics. Most notably, this debate
is central to questions about whether clinical practice guidelines
should be accepted in court as relevant in malpractice cases.
Clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) are guidelines for health
care providers offering expert guidance regarding diagnosis and
treatment of various conditions. 247 They attempt to standardize

the practice of medicine and improve the overall quality and
outcome of health care as a result. 248 They can range from simple

DOBBS ET AL., supra note 115, § 13.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
246.
See supra Section L.B.2; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 52, cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2000) (noting that this provision in the Model Rules
"does not comment on, and is not inconsistent with, the use of rules as evidence of violation
of an existing duty of care").
247.
Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice
Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 649 (2001); Maxwell
J. Mehlman, Medical Practice Guidelines as Malpractice Safe Harbors:Illusion or Deceit?,
40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 286, 286-300 (2012); MARILYN J. FIELD & KATHLEEN N. LOHR,
244.
245.

CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM 27, 56 (1990), http://ww

w.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK235751/; Chris Taylor, The Use of Clinical Practice
Guidelines in Determining Standard of Care, 35 J. LEGAL MED. 273, 273-74 (2014).
248.
Taylor, supra note 247, at 274.
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flow charts to complex analyses several pages in length. 249 CPGs
may be created by professional medical associations, government
entities, health care institutions, or insurers. 25 0 Depending on
their intended purpose, they may vary in how they are
developed.251 On one hand, CPGs may address how to achieve

superior medical outcomes; alternatively, they may address
concerns about costs raised by health care payers. 252

Since the 1990's, scholars and policymakers have debated
whether litigants should be able to rely on CPGs in medical

malpractice suits.

253

Physicians argued that compliance with

CPGs should be a defense to medical malpractice, while injured
patients argued that noncompliance with CPGs should be grounds
for a malpractice claim. 254 Initially, there was support for the use
of CPGs in tort litigation. 25 5 Indeed, some state legislatures passed
statutes permitting physician-defendants to rely on compliance
249.

See generally Michael D. Seidman et al., Clinical Practice Guideline: Allergic

Rhinitis, 152 AM. ACAD. OTOLARYNGOLOGY-HEAD & NECK SURGERY FOUND. S1 (2015); AM.
UROLOGICAL ASS'N, AMERICAN UROLOGICAL ASSOCIATION GUIDELINE: MANAGEMENT OF
BENIGN PROSTATIC HYPERPLASIA (BPH) (2010); Clinical Efficacy of Probiotics:Review of the
Evidence with Focus on Children, 43 J. PEDIATRIC GASTROENTEROLOGY & NUTRITION 550
(2006).

Mello, supra note 247, at 650-52.
250.
251.
FIELD & LOHR, supra note 247, at 15-16.
252.
Mello, supra note 247, at 652.
253.
See generally Mello, supra note 247, at 648, 668 (describing three models of tort
reform that use CPGs in medical malpractice suits as the basis for a legal standard of care
or an affirmative defense); Mehlman, supra note 247, at 286, 298-99 (proposing use of
medical practice guidelines as establishing a standard of care to eliminate conflicting expert
testimony, and analyzing the likely consequences of doing so); Mark A. Hall, The Defensive
Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1991, at 119, 130-32, 140-42 (1991) (explaining the favorable outcome and
judicial/evidentiary drawbacks of using CPGs as a basis for establishing custom in medical
malpractice cases); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal StandardsGoverning
Physician Liability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 87, 87-88, 100, 103, 117
(1991) (analyzing the use of CPGs as a standard of care, and suggesting that a model with
competing guidelines may allow health care system participants to choose what standard
of care should apply); Josephine Y. King, Practice Guidelines & Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 16 MED. & L. 29, 35-36 (1996) (analyzing the use of CPGs in medical malpractice
litigation and the shortcomings of doing so); Patricia R. Recupero, Clinical Practice
Guidelines as Learned Treatises: UnderstandingTheir Use as Evidence in the Courtroom,
36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 290, 292-93 (2008) (exploring how CPGs should be used
in litigation and with respect to expert witnesses).
See generally King, supra note 253 (discussing the expectation that CPGs be used
254.
to exculpate physicians from liability and the desire of plaintiff patients to use CPGs as
evidence).
255.
Recupero, supra note 253, at 293-94 (describing how CPGs were used in defining
the medical standard of care during trial in Moore v. Baker, Washington v. Washington
Hospital Center, and Price v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation);Taylor, supra note 247, at 28183 (analyzing cases where CPGs were introduced into evidence such as Jilek v. Stockson
and Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, but also those where they were excluded at trial such as
Greathouse v. Rhodes & Duge).
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with a CPG as a defense to malpractice. 256 Over time, however,
most commentators reached the conclusion that there were serious

problems with CPGs as a whole and therefore that using them in
litigation in any conclusive fashion was a mistake. 25 7

Today, many courts allow experts to rely on CPGs as learned
treatises to support their testimony but not as a definitive basis
for liability or as a conclusive defense. 258 In deciding whether to
admit CPGs as learned treatises, courts assess the reliability and
relevance of the guidelines to the case at hand. 25 9

Some of these statutes were extremely one-sided, establishing that compliance
256.
with CPGs conclusively immunizes defendants from tort liability but not permitting injured
plaintiffs to rely on CPGs. Mehlman, supra note 247, at 286-87 (citing a 1990 Maine
demonstration project and Minnesota legislation establishing one-sided use of CPGs as a
defense); Jennifer Begel, Maine Physician Practice Guidelines: Implications for Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 47 ME. L. REV. 69, 78-82 (1995) (analyzing Maine's statute
concerning the use of CPGs as an affirmative defense, and critiquing the statutory scheme
as it applies to procedural aspects of Maine's laws); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971979 (1990) (repealed 1999); MINN. STAT. § 62J.34 (1994) (repealed 1995); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 413.011(1)(e) (2011); see also Amy Widman, Liability and the Health Care Bill: An
Alternative Perspective, 1 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 57, 58, 65 (2010) (discussing a proposal in
PPACA that doctors who follow CPGs should have presumptive immunity from malpractice
liability).
257.
See, e.g., Mello, supra note 247, at 666-67, 672, 702 (arguing that both the
exculpatory and inculpatory use of CPGs in tort litigation is deeply problematic, and
recommending that the use of CPGs in malpractice cases be restricted to expert reliance);
Mehlman, supra note 247, at 289, 298 (critiquing use of CPGs as subjecting medical
professionals to only one way of treating patients instead of using their own expertise, and
addressing the likely consequence that a guideline meant only for defensive use may end
up being used by the plaintiff as well); Hall, supranote 253, at 131-34 (arguing that using
CPGs is problematic because precedents treat offensive and defensive use of guidelines
differently and the rules of evidence pose issues of presenting the guidelines to the jury).
Some scholars argue that the use of CPGs in this fashion is unconstitutional. King, supra
note 253, at 38 (arguing that disallowing the inculpatory use of CPGs, as in Maine, violates
equal protection and due process); Shuman, supra note 226, at 99, 106 (noting that
incorporating CPGs in litigation raises constitutional questions which may ultimately
discourage defense attorneys from using them); Begel, supra note 256, at 88-89 (arguing
that a constitutional violation could result because legislation proscribing the use of CPGs
could usurp judicial function and may burden plaintiffs more than defendants). But see
Mello, supra note 247, at 705-07 (disagreeing with Begel, and arguing that an equal
protection challenge would be unsuccessful because the relevant law would likely survive
rational basis scrutiny).
258.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18) allows learned treatises to be used during
expert witness testimony to establish a standard of care. Mello, supra note 247, at 663;
Recupero, supra note 253, at 292 (acknowledging the use of CPGs in the courtroom today,
but noting that their admissibility and use varies depending on the type of case and
intended use).
259.
See, e.g., Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants P.C., No. 01-A-01-9702-CV-00069,
1997 WL 536949, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that CPGs could be admitted as
substantive evidence, as long as they were established as reliable authority and not just to
impeach the expert witness's credibility); Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, 848 N.E.2d 1285, 1291 (N.Y.
2006) (finding that CPGs provided by the expert witness were admissible as an exception
to hearsay because they were merely an illustration of the physician's thought process).
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There are some similarities between CPGs and the types of
professional ethical standards litigants might rely on in cases of
ethical malpractice. Both provide physicians with guidance as to
the expected standards of practice within the profession, whether
ethical or technical. Both may be helpful to courts and juries in

assessing the customary standard of practice.
But as noted above, the use of CPGs in tort litigation has been
widely criticized. The biggest criticism is that CPGs (arguably, like
ethics statements by professional associations) may not actually
represent the standard of care, especially as different entities may
craft different CPGs on the same condition. 260 Rather than
representing professional custom as a matter of practice, they may
instead represent an aspirational or optimal standard of care.
Indeed, in the case of CPGs, evidence suggests that few health care
providers actually follow these guidelines. 261 Alternatively, some
CPGs may not be aimed at improving quality of care for individual
patients at all; for example, CPGs created by insurers or health
care institutions may instead be targeted to resource allocation
goals. 26 2 If that is the case, it would be a mistake to rely on them
as a conclusive representation of the standard of care for the
purposes of malpractice liability.
Similar challenges could be raised in the ethics context-most
notably the concern that these ethics standards may represent
aspirational ideals, not baseline floors. Several commentators in
health law and bioethics have raised similar concerns, although in
reverse-namely, that the minimal standards of conduct set by
tort law are not in fact the appropriate standard of care and ethical
professional practice requires more. 26 3 This argument has been
Mello, supra note 247, at 677-83 (arguing that certain CPGs may only be
260.
intended to present an option for treatment instead of a custom, that new standards take
time to actually become widely adopted by the medical community, and that compliance
with CPGs may not be great enough to justify using them as custom); Mehlman, supranote
247, at 296 (questioning whether a CPG intended to indicate "best practices" is sufficient
to delineate a standard of care); see also Ray Fish & Melvin Ehrhardt, The Standard of
Care, 12 J. EMERGENCY MED. 545, 547 (1994) ('"The fact that a proposed standard has been
published by a credible medical society probably does indicate that to follow the proposed
standard would be acceptable practice.... However, published recommendations are not
generally regarded as standards of care until they are widely accepted by physicians.").
261.
Mello, supra note 247, at 680-82; see also Wolfram, supra note 181, at 284 (in the
context of legal practice, identifying ethical norms as aspirational, indicating behavior that
is preferred but not mandatory).

262.
Mehlman, supra note 247, at 297 (asserting that certain CPGs should not be used,
as they are issued by private insurers and intended to address cost concerns).
263.
Charity Scott, Why Law Prevades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health Care,
14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 245, 259-60 (2000); Dena S. Davis, The
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made frequently in the informed consent context, with scholars

arguing that the "legalization" of informed consent has caused
providers to default to the minimal legal standard, rather than
actually do what is right for patients.

264

That said, it is not inconsistent to say that tort law sets too
low a standard for ethical practice while also recognizing that the
ethical practices of the medical profession may be helpful guidance
for tort law. Just as tort law turns to medical custom, as explained
by experts, in defining the standard of care, customary ethical
practice could be similarly relevant. Admittedly, there is a clear

difference between admitting CPGs and ethics statements to
establish the standard of care and litigants relying on them to
justify why a particular course of action was or was not
appropriate. But as long as these standards are not considered
dispositive on their own and are treated merely as one permissible
piece of evidence in connection with expert testimony that explains
their relevance and that can be interrogated further, they are
certainly helpful to factfinders in evaluating how a defendant's

conduct compares to the customary standard of the profession.
One concern, however-also relevant to the arguments raised
in section V.A-is that the use of ethical standards in the context
of civil litigation may result in reluctance on the part of
professional organizations to promulgate aspirational standards.

As such, incorporation of professional ethics as relevant to
determinations of standard of care may backfire if professional
organizations act to shield themselves from litigation.
C. Integrationof Ethics into Tort Law as Self-Defeating
Section III.A.2 highlighted informed consent doctrine as one
example of how tort law has already integrated one key principle

of medical ethics. This analogy, however, also highlights an
important concern. While the establishment of a tort cause of
action for breach of informed consent duties was initially
welcomed as a key step in acknowledging and supporting patients'
rights to autonomous decision-making, recent scholarship has

Ambiguous Effects of Tort Law on Bioethics: The Case of Doctor-Patient Communication,
21 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 264, 267-70 (2010).
264.
See infra Section V.C.
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challenged the "tort-ificiation" of informed consent law as
counterproductive. 26 5
In the context of informed consent to treatment, scholars of

medicine, medical ethics, and even health law have argued that
recognition of informed consent in American tort law has actually
negatively impacted physicians' compliance with ethical principles

and, in turn, patients' ability to make autonomous and informed
health care decisions. Their primary concern is that physicians
have shifted from thinking about informed consent as an iterative
and context-sensitive process grounded in ethical obligations to
simply seeking a patient's signature on a standardized form
drafted by hospital counsel that satisfies the minimum legal
obligations. 266 Clear legal standards have, in effect, replaced
independent judgment about the ethical practice of medicine.
There are numerous reasons why this is viewed as problematic.
One of the most commonly discussed is the fact that the legal
doctrine of informed consent focuses exclusively on the type of
information the physician is required to disclose but says nothing
about whether this information is communicated in such a way as
to facilitate the patient's understanding. 26 7 In particular, literature
See, e.g., Valerie Gutmann Koch, Eliminating Liability for Lack of Informed
265.
Consent to Medical Treatment, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1211, 1226-39 (2018) (identifying
criticisms of modern informed consent doctrine, and considering the possibility that
abandoning the common law informed consent cause of action might be more beneficial to

patients); Davis, supra note 263, at 264 (arguing that bioethics has been "stunted by the
influence of legal thinking, and by an unstated, often unexamined, subservience to legal
norms"); id. at 270 (arguing that "what is appropriate for law is not necessarily appropriate
for ethics, or for norms of professional practice" and that ethical norms "should be 'thicker'
and more demanding than the minimalist requirements of the law"); Scott, supra note 263,
at 246 ("Paradoxically and unfortunately, when law becomes the primary enforcer of ethical
views, its power can create problems, or pitfalls, for continued ethical reflection on the very
issues that it was called upon to address in the first place."); O. O'Neill, Some Limits of
Informed Consent, 29 J. MED. ETHIcS 4, 4-6 (2003) (explaining that although informed
consent may seem to offer patients autonomy, this hinges on several factors including the
definition of autonomy and the term "informed consent" itself); Hon. Justice M.D. Kirby,
Informed Consent: What Does It Mean?, 9 J. MED. ETHICS 69, 72-73 (1983) (analyzing the
drawbacks of executing informed consent, such as ascertaining exactly what a patient
should know before undergoing treatment and the arbitrary nature of informed consent);
Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale?-Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 139
(1977) (arguing that the purpose of the common law of informed consent-the promotion of
patients' decisional autonomy-has "been severely compromised from the beginning" and
that "the doctrine of informed consent remains a symbol which despite widespread currency
has had little impact on patients' decision-making").
See, e.g., Koch, supra note 265, at 1224-27.
266.
See, e.g., Melissa Bekelja Wanzer et al., Enhancing the "Informed" in Informed
267.
Consent: A Pilot Test of a Multimedia Presentation,25 HEALTH CoMMC'N 365, 366 (2010)
(noting that informed consent is limited due to issues of health literacy, and understanding
that the average consent form requires sixteen years of education); Daniel Purcaru et al.,
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on health literacy suggests that thinking about informed consent
without considering patient comprehension makes the doctrine

almost useless.

268

Physicians themselves have criticized the

legally mandated requirements of informed consent as
diminishing and simplifying their obligations in a way that does
not serve the interests of their patients. The move towards shared
decision-making as a standard of ethical medical practice seeks to
remedy these problems. 269
I share many of these commentators' concerns about how legal
doctrine has arguably weakened the way that the informed
consent conversation is performed in practice. Likewise, I

acknowledge that recognizing a duty to comply with specific
ethical commitments or using professionally recognized standards

of ethics to define the standard of care in malpractice cases risks
simplifying ethical norms in a way that may be counterproductive.
If the motivation behind "tort-ifying" medical ethics is to improve

conditions for patients, this approach may benefit some injured
patients seeking compensation, but it might not improve the
overall practice of medicine. Physicians might rely on ethics

statements and comply with them to the letter and use that as a
defense, rather than engaging in a more nuanced and contextual
analysis of what ethics and law require in a given circumstance.
Informed Consent: How Much Awareness Is There?, PLOS ONE (Oct. 2014), https://journals
.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0110139
[https://perma.cc/EPK5-SSLN]
(analyzing patients' ability to recall information on informed consent forms and finding that
patients were oftentimes unable to do so); Kenneth D. Hopper et al., Informed Consent
Formsfor Clinicaland Research ImagingProcedures:How Much Do Patients Understand?,
164 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 493, 493 (1995) (concluding that consent forms used in
radiology practice are oftentimes "too complex for the average patient to understand").
268.
See, e.g., Vanessa Watts Simonds et al., Health Literacy and Informed Consent
Materials: Designed for Documentation, Not Comprehension of Health Research, 22 J.
HEALTH COMMC'N 682, 683 (2017) ("Although not intentionally deceptive, consent forms
often use complex language and are designed primarily to document agreement to
participate rather than to ensure that participants understand the proposed research.");
Bonne Lorenzen et al., UsingPrinciplesof Health Literacy to Enhance the Informed Consent
Process, 88 AORN J. 23, 24 (2008) (describing one hospital's experience with revising
informed consent forms to increase patient comprehension, and noting that "[t]he Office of
the General Counsel of the American Medical Association contends that the essence of
informed consent is not having a patient sign a written form but is a process involving
communication between a patient and physician that includes verification of a patient's
understanding and then authorization or agreement to undergo a specific medical
intervention"); Leonardo Tamariz et al., Improving the Informed Consent Process for
Research Subjects with Low Literacy:A Systematic Review, 28 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 121,
121 (2012) ("Research participants with inadequate or marginal health literacy may not be
able to fully comprehend the information disclosed in consent forms.").
269.
See generally Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical
Decision-Making: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 85-87
(2010); Glyn Elwyn et al., Shared DecisionMaking: A Model for ClinicalPractice,27 J. GEN.
INTERN. MED. 1361, 1361-62 (2012).
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It is difficult to reach a firm conclusion on whether this is a
risk we are willing to take. Were we to imagine a counterfactual
world in which U.S. law had not embraced the doctrine of informed
consent, what would conditions be like for patients in the
twenty-first century? Some might argue that medical practice
would have continued to operate in a world of silence, where
physicians view disclosure of information only as a means of
securing the patient's consent to a predetermined medical decision
and conceal information that might cause patients to second-guess
the physician's judgment. I believe this is unlikely, given the
aftermath of Nazi medical experimentation, 270 Henry Beecher's
influential 1966 article about research ethics violations, 271 the rise
of the patient rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s, 27 2 and the
1972 disclosure of the Tuskegee syphilis experiments. 273 While
many of these addressed questions of consent to medical research,
rather than treatment, the underlying principles of the need for
disclosure, comprehension, and consent are the same. It seems
likely that both patient advocates and progressive health care
providers would have moved for the integration of informed
consent into medical practice with or without legal enforcement.
And perhaps this self-driven integration would have led to more
robust and nuanced informed consent practices, closer to the
shared decision-making model.
It is certainly an open question whether health care providers
would be more inclined to integrate medical ethics into their
practices if prompted by professional expectations as opposed to
legal obligations. That said, it's likely that they would take a more
nuanced approach to ethical decision-making when guided by
professional rather than legal norms, which would benefit patients
overall. The downside of this, of course, is that it would not
guarantee legal recourse for patients who have been injured by
ethical violations. This speaks to the dual goals of tort law in
incentivizing reasonable behavior by defendants while also
providing compensation for injured patients. Is it worth it to
establish a system of victim compensation if the consequence of

270.
Evelyne Shuster, Fifty Years Later: The Significanceof the Nuremberg Code, 337
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1436, 1437-39 (1997).
271.
See Jay Katz, "Ethics and Clinical Research" Revisited: A Tribute to Henry K.
Beecher, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 34. See generally Henry K. Beecher,
Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966).
See supra note 100.
272.
273.
David M. Smolin, The Tushegee Syphilis Experiment, Social Change, and the
Future of Bioethics, 3 FAULKNER L. REV. 229, 229, 234 (2012).
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that is an arguable weakening of professional norms? This is a
difficult question to answer.
D. Civil Litigation Is Not the Right Approach for Addressing
Ethical Breaches
Throughout this Article, references have been made to other
methods by which the breach of ethical norms by health care
providers might be addressed. Some might argue that these
approaches are more effective than recovery through civil
litigation in addressing issues of ethical misconduct.
Most notably, professional licensure and discipline by state

medical boards can be an effective mechanism for not only
disciplining physician misconduct but potentially limiting or
barring those physicians' ability to practice, thereby protecting
patients on a broader scale. Peer review and credentialing actions
by hospital medical staff can result in similar actions. But while
these actions limit the ability of physicians to practice, they do not
provide any recourse for patients who have been injured.

Meaningful

criminal

sanctions

in

cases

of

egregious

misconduct like sexual assault likewise punish problematic
physicians and protect the public 274 but do not offer compensatory
mechanisms for victims of criminal conduct.
Finally, statutory protections in a wide variety of contexts
may prompt investigation by regulators and result in sanctions

against problematic physicians. These protections, however, only
rarely provide recourse to injured patients. For example, HIPAA,
the key federal statute protecting privacy and confidentiality in
the health care sphere, does not provide a private right of action

to patients whose confidentiality was violated. 275 EMTALA, which
protects against discrimination in the provision of emergency

medical services, grants injured patients a right of action only
against the hospital, not the physician whose refusal to treat
274.
That said, criminal actions against physicians do not always result in meaningful
penalties. See Carrie Teegardin & Lois Norder, Doctors Cut Deals for Sex Crimes, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., https://doctors.ajc.com/doctors_cutdeals_for_sexcrimes [https://perma.cc/TVJ6
-AYGK] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
275.
That said, some state courts are willing to incorporate HIPAA's standards into
the standard of care for civil suits based on breach of confidentiality. Byrne v. Avery Ctr.
for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 46-49 (Conn. 2014) (holding that HIPAA
and its implementing regulations may inform the standard of care applicable to common
law claims arising from a health care provider's alleged breach of its duty of confidentiality);
see also I.S. v. Wash. Univ., No. 4:11CV235, 2011 WL 2433585, at *1, *3 (E.D. Mo. June 14,
2011) (addressing jurisdictional issues of a claim of negligence per se based on violations of
HIPAA).
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caused the patient injury. 276 Section 1557 of Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which protects against
discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age,
and disability, does not provide a right of action but leaves
enforcement authority to the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS). 277 The federal Anti-Kickback Statute, which is
intended to regulate financial conflicts of interest in the health
care sphere, likewise offers no private right of action. 278
There are many reasons to be concerned about ethical
violations by health care providers, and many ways in which U.S.
law could respond to them. Prevention, deterrence, and
punishment are all valid approaches. But in so many of the cases
addressed in this Article, ethical breaches result in meaningful
patient harm-whether physical, dignitary, or financial. I contend
that while these alternative mechanisms for addressing ethical
breaches are important, they fail to serve the important
compensatory role of tort law and civil litigation.
E. A Civil Cause of Action for Ethical Breaches Is Duplicative

and Unnecessary
A final criticism of any proposal to grant tort recovery for
physicians' breaches of well-established principles of medical
ethics is that such an approach is simply unnecessary. Just as
many courts have rejected patients' fiduciary duty claims as being
duplicative of medical malpractice claims, 279 one might argue that
any injury experienced as a result of an ethical breach could
adequately be addressed by the medical malpractice system.
Furthermore, one might argue that ethical breaches, like informed
consent claims, 28 0 rarely stand on their own in the absence of some
underlying malpractice.
However, it seems that this conclusion is not supported either
by evidence or by tort theory. First, as demonstrated in section

III.B, there are many cases where patients have experienced
ethical breaches, pointed to principles of medical ethics as a basis
for their legal claims, and have been left with no remedy, even
under traditional theories of recovery. Likewise, the cases cited in

276.

See supranote 63.

277.

See supra note 65.

Fraud & Abuse Laws, HHS-OIG, https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-e
278.
ducation/fraud-abuse-laws/ [https://perma.ce/K3FC-DAUL] (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
279.
See supra Section III.A.4.
See supra Section III.A.2.
280.
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ethical

breaches-like refusing to treat a patient on the basis of their race,
religion, or gender-may not violate any legal duties established
by common law. 28 1 The Introduction also identifies some examples
where ethical breaches are so common as to be customary-as in
the case of nonconsensual pelvic examinations-and therefore not
a basis for recovery under a custom-based malpractice standard.
As a matter of tort doctrine and theory as well, I reject the
idea that a claim for breach of an ethical duty is duplicative of a
medical malpractice claim (or other common law claim for

recovery). While in an ideal world the physician's standard of care
for malpractice purposes would include skill, knowledge,
expertise, professionalism, and ethics, courts rarely view it that
way. 28 2 Often, the injuries suffered as a result of ethical breaches
are dignitary, emotional, or economic and therefore not
compensable under a traditional malpractice system. Other times,
an ethical breach may not actually be a breach of customary
practice, in which case it would not be a basis for recovery. And
while in some cases a patient could prevail on another tort

theory-for example, battery in the context of unconsented-to
sexual contact-there is clearly something unique about battery
by a physician versus battery by another party. Most obviously, it
seems that the physician's role as a fiduciary makes the battery
even more egregious; however, as noted in section III.A.4, it is rare

for courts to actually hold physicians to the legal standards of
fiduciaries and impose liability when they breach those standards.
I would argue that physicians' ethical duties are often tied to their
fiduciary duties and challenge the idea that claims for breach of
such duties by physicians are duplicative of claims for medical
negligence. 283
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

At this point in time, it seems premature to advocate for an
independent tort of ethical malpractice grounded in the idea that
professional ethical guidelines establish legally binding duties. As
noted above, this approach may shift law's expectations of
281.
Though they may violate statutory protections like the Civil Rights Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and § 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.
282.
See supra Sections III.B.1, III.B.3.
283.
Mehlman, supra note 124, at 27-30; see also Anderson & Steele, supra note 134,
at 251-60.
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reasonable physician behavior to be too aspirational, which is at
odds with the traditional understanding of tort law. Alternatively,
it may weaken health care providers' willingness to engage in
nuanced ethical reasoning by offering them a simple and uniform
way of satisfying legal requirements. Furthermore, the U.S. tort
284
and
system as a whole is widely acknowledged to be inefficient
has been challenged by both plaintiffs and defendants as unjust.
That said, the research in Part III indicates that under the status

quo, patients who are injured by ethical violations are often unable
to recover.
While recognizing ethical malpractice as an independent
cause of action may be premature, it is a mistake to reject the legal
relevance of ethical principles in medicine entirely. There is no
reason why ethical guidelines shouldn't be considered relevant to
an expert's assessment of the professional standard of care, in such
a way that a breach of those ethical guidelines might subject the
defendant to liability under traditional malpractice principles.
However, if breaches of professional ethics were simply
viewed as breaches of the standard of care under traditional
malpractice principles, they would be subject to the same
limitations as that model. The most significant of these, when
considering the types of situations in which ethical violations often
arise, is the requirement that a plaintiff in a malpractice suit
demonstrate physical-not just dignitary-harm. Thus, the more
cautious approach of recognizing professional ethics as relevant to
the standard of care would not address the concerns of patients
with intangible injuries.
Perhaps, over time, if some context-specific ethical guidelines
become well established in medical practice, courts might be
willing to translate them into an independent duty of care. By way

284.
Options
Practice
medical

See, e.g., Daniel P. Kessler, Evaluating the Medical Malpractice System and
for Reform, J. ECON. PERSP. Spring 2011, at 95 (citing a 1990 Harvard Medical
Study that found that "only 1 in 15 patients who suffer injuries as a result of
malpractice receive compensation, and that five-sixths of cases that receive

compensation have no evidence of negligence"); THOMAS H. COHEN & KRISTEN A. HUGHES,
BUREAU OF JUSTIcE STATISTIcS SPECIAL REPORT: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE

CLAIMS IN SEVEN STATES, 2000-2004 5 (2007), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/mmics
s04.pdf [https://perma.cc/XUD5-WGQK (finding that in Florida, Texas, and Missouri, it
takes four years on average to resolve a malpractice claim; in Nevada and Illinois, slightly
over five years); Studdert et al., supra note 86, at 2024 (finding that for every dollar of tort
compensation in medical malpractice cases, fifty-four cents went to litigation expenses and
costs); see also David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort
Reform: It's the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1089-91 (2006); Troyen A.
Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of
Medical-MalpracticeLitigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1963 (1996).
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of example, the ethical duty of confidentiality has become fairly
well integrated into various common law theories of recovery, even
if not every court accepts it as an independent cause of action. 28 5
Perhaps there may be other ethical principles that are so well
established in modern medical practice such that they ought to be
recognized more formally as a basis for civil recovery when
breaches
occur.
Potential
opportunities
might include:

discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, disability, and
other protected characteristics; 286 appropriate situations for
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment;287 physicians' obligations
to be vaccinated to protect their patients; 288 maintaining
appropriate sexual boundaries; 289 and managing conflicts of
interest. 29 0 Or, as in the case of informed consent, courts might
step in to create a legal duty even though medicine has not yet
fully adopted an ethical practice.

If such a move were to occur, there are numerous practical
and procedural questions that would need to be considered. For
example, whether claims for ethical malpractice would be subject
to the same procedural limitations as medical malpractice claims

(such as pre-certification requirements, abbreviated statutes of
limitations, and damages caps); whether evidence of compliance or

deviation from ethical standards would be dispositive with respect
285.
See supra Section JII.A.3.
286.
See Patient-Physician Relationships, Opinion E-1.1.2, AM. MED. AS5'N,
https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-1.pdf
[https://perma
.cc/2UGW-TNHT] (last visited Apr. 24, 2022) (requiring that physicians "uphold ethical
responsibilities not to discriminate against a prospective patient on the basis of race,
gender, sexual orientation or gender identity, or other personal or social characteristics that
are not clinically relevant to the patient's care").
287.
See Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment, Opinion E-5.3,
AM. MED. Ass'N, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/withholding-or-withdra
wing-life-sustaining-treatment [https://perma.cc/RFV7-JGAT] (last visited Apr. 24, 2022)
(establishing guidelines for physician involvement in patient decision-making for end of life
care decisions).
288.
See Physicians & Health of Cmty., Opinion E-8.7, AM. MED. AS'N
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/routine-universal-immunization-physicia
ns [https://perma.cc/9QF7-7MLT] (last visited Apr. 24, 2022) (identifying immunization as
one of physicians' "ethical responsibilit[ies] to ... prevent the spread of infectious disease
in health care settings").
289.
See Professional Self-Regulation, Opinion E-9.1.1-3, AM. MED. ASS'N, https://
www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/romantic-or-sexual-relationships-patients
[https
://perma.cc/ZT4A-XQNA] (last visited Apr. 24, 2022) (discussing romantic or sexual relationships
with patients, romantic or sexual relationships with key third parties, and sexual
harassment in the practice of medicine).
290.
See Financing and Delivery of Health Care, Opinion E-11.2.2, AM. MED. ASS'N,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/conflicts-interest-patient-care
[https://per
ma.cc/YX7D-5C9N] (last visited Apr. 24, 2022) (discussing conflicts of interest in patient
care).
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to liability, or if there would be some flexibility to consider their
evidentiary value; and finally, whether claims of ethical
malpractice would require proof of physical injury, or if they might
be brought on the basis of dignitary harm alone, which would raise
questions about appropriate calculation of damages. 291
It is impossible to predict how common law will develop. That
said, as more litigants affirmatively introduce principles of
medical ethics to support their claims, courts may begin-in some
form or another-to recognize their injuries as legally
compensable harms.

291.

See supra Section IV.B.
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